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FOUR POLICY PERSPECTIVES: THE SOVIET UNION AND WESTERN EUROPE (U)
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
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FOUR POLICY PERSPECTIVES:
THE SOVIET UNION AND WESTERN EUROPE

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Soviet policy in Europe is more complicated, more elusive than it has been for a long time. On fundamental issues--like West European integration, Germany, and the future of NATO--Soviet attitudes are much more indeterminate and ambivalent than ten or even five years ago. This is, in part, the natural consequence of the Soviet Union's gradual adjustment to the survival of NATO and the Common Market. In part, it is also the consequence of détente and the partial realization of traditional objectives, coupled with the need to recast objectives still unrealized.

In the first case, the definition of policy becomes infinitely more subtle when the question shifts from accepting Atlantic ties or not, West European economic integration or not, to accepting them in what form and to what end? Perhaps Soviet policymakers have even found reasons for wishing these forms of Western cooperation to continue. But both still also stir fundamental reservations. This tension between the policymaker's underlying instincts and concerns and his shorter range practical calculations reinforces the complexity and ambiguity of policy.

In the second case, the issue of Germany, a principal objective orienting Soviet European policy for most of the last two decades has been largely achieved. To the extent that the task of getting the West and, foremostly, the Federal Republic, to come to terms with a divided Germany in a divided Europe consumed much of the policymaker's time and imagination, the recent settlements have changed all that. There are features of the German problem that persist and so do the concerns over the stability of empire that served to inspire the Soviet approach to the German problem. But these persist in a significantly different context: (1) one in which it is no longer necessary or productive

to work against Bonn; the challenge is rather the more delicate one of working with Bonn; (2) in which it is no longer necessary or appropriate to subordinate policy to the aim of increasing the woes of the Atlantic and West European partnership; the challenge is rather the more intricate one of protecting the pursuit of détente's rewards from the increase in these woes and the increase in these woes from the pursuit of détente's rewards; and, (3) in which it is no longer possible to practice the complementary policies of political warfare and economic autarky; the challenge is the trickier one of balancing economic interdependence against socio-political insulation.

There used to be another dimension to the challenge of the EEC, NATO, and the German problem making life simpler for Soviet leaders. This was their perception of all three as linked and mutually reinforcing. It was easier to make up your mind about the Common Market when it seemed to be only an economic auxiliary of the military alliance; about NATO when it appeared to be the essential foundation for German obstinacy; and about the German problem when it heightened all the worse implications of alliances and economic partnerships. Now, in a sense, those links have been broken. The Atlantic Alliance and the Common Market are not neatly coordinated pieces bringing American power to bear in Europe and Europe to heel behind American objectives elsewhere. And neither is any longer the key support for "revanchist" German claims in Eastern Europe. This, too, complicates the implications of each.

Finally, to draw out a point already touched upon, it is not only changes in traditional concerns that obscure the premises of policy. They are also obscured by the need in some cases, or by the opportunity in others, to deal with new and frequently original developments. Thus, on the one hand, Soviet

leaders have come to count on a long-term and extensive economic cooperation with Western Europe, a commitment, which, whether it succeeds or not, does for the moment affect the Soviet stake in a stable Western Europe as well as in stable East-West relations.

Moreover, this stake in Western stability, or, short of that, the Soviet stake in "cooperating" with the West, almost certainly includes the hope of enlisting Western help in easing the political and security concerns of the East. In short, new interdependencies are slowly forming (beyond the traditional military interdependency of the 1950s and 1960s) requiring of Soviet leaders more difficult and often more obscure differentiations than in the past. Among these, political interdependency even more than economic interdependency turns policy from one of clearcut choices toward one of nuances.

On the other hand, in the last year or so, Western Europe has been struck by two different but potentially reinforcing kinds of ferment. First is the serious general deterioration of nearly all Western European economies with the disruptive effects this has had on domestic support for governments and on these governments' relations with one another. Second is the dramatic and sometimes profound political change rocking the two extremes of Southern Europe, change that may recur with greater impact in Italy or Spain. This must make Western Europe look to the Soviet leaders like one of the better illustrations of capitalism's current tendency to generate multiple crises simultaneously and simultaneously to spread these "to all major capitalist centers." The scale and variety of these disorders, the Soviets say, are what give particular force to the present phase in the "deepening general crisis of capitalism."

Conceivably the prospect of rapid change in Europe has prompted second thoughts about the priorities established under détente and the price paid to

them. At what level these second thoughts may exist (and among whom) are issues raised in the last part of this paper. Short of raising questions about the stake that the Soviet Union has in détente, however, Western Europe's ferment no doubt vexes *current* priorities. That is, it no doubt makes more difficult the task of the kind of cooperation to which the Soviet leaders committed themselves in the early 1970s. Apprehensive and preoccupied Western leaders have their minds on other things than trade levels with the socialist countries or the growth of foreign investment in the Soviet petroleum industry. In short, the challenge of dealing with West European instability is not easily harmonized with the challenge of managing new interdependencies, and the result contributes further to Soviet ambivalence.

The large question to which this paper is addressed is what practical effect have all these changes in environment had on Soviet policy. Not merely, what are Soviet thoughts about the underlying drift of events, but, how do these influence the Soviet approach to the present? There are two, not always automatically compatible, dimensions from which this problem is usually attacked: For those most accustomed to theorizing about international relations, the tendency is to stress the Soviet perception of basic trends in Western Europe and Western Europe's place in a transitional international order, casting Soviet perceptions in highly conceptual terms that are more intended to explore the mentality that Soviet leaders bring to European developments than to identify or explain the calculations behind their specific policy initiatives. Those, however, who must deal with Soviet policy initiatives are more inclined to look for patterns in the way Soviets respond to or exploit particular events.

Without trying to draw an artificial distinction between Soviet perceptions of basic trends and Soviet reactions to particular events or to suggest that either kind of analyst ignores the other dimension, it is worth noting the difference in

stress and its consequences. The first kind of analyst tends to explain Soviet reactions to events (say those in Portugal since April 25, 1974) as a function of Soviet perceptions of basic trends (say the interplay among the rise of the left, the course of détente, and the erosion of "Atlanticism"). The second tends to construct Soviet attitudes toward basic trends (say, the transformation of NATO and the process of West European defense integration) from Soviet initiatives in specific instances (say, Eastern proposals at the Vienna force reduction talks). As a consequence, the second tends to miss the interconnections among Soviet concerns and the ambivalence that these generate in the Soviet approach to European developments. The first tends to treat Soviet concerns at a level of abstraction seemingly divorced from day-to-day behavior.

In turn these differences stem from the bases of judgment used by each. The first forms his impressions from the public commentary of Soviet leaders, publicists, and academics--particularly from the commentary of the academics, for it is they who say the most about international affairs and in terms most familiar to him, and it is they who are the readiest to see him and exchange ideas directly. The second forms his impressions from Soviet activity, particularly, diplomatic activity and, frequently, consults this activity to explain what Soviet leaders mean in their public comments on international events. Again, neither excludes the other basis of analysis, but because of the differing weights that each attach to each, the contrasts in stress are reinforced. In brief the differences are methodological as well as conceptual.

The Framework of Analysis

The point of departure of this paper is a series of specific policy problems facing Soviet leaders. I have chosen this point of departure to compensate for my academic's tendency to brush aside the everyday in building semi-abstract

frameworks of analysis. Each policy problem raised, however, ultimately touches a basic concern, and these basic concerns taken together represent the broader sweep of Soviet hopes and fears for Europe.

The first, the problem of working out a formal (diplomatic) relationship between the Common Market and the CMEA, depends ultimately on the challenge that Soviet leaders see in the process of West European integration. The second, the problem of reaching an accord in the Vienna force reduction negotiations (MBFR) involves a series of fundamental concerns such as trends within NATO, the future of West European defense cooperation and the potential role of German military power in Europe. The third, the problem of designing follow-up to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) impinges very soon on the question of the nature of détente and its effect on the stability of relationships within and among the socialist states of Eastern Europe. The fourth, the problem of responding to events in Portugal since the overthrow of the old regime dramatizes the question of the Left's relationship to fundamental change and of fundamental change to détente.

By starting with specific Soviet initiatives (1) toward the EEC, (2) at the MBFR talks, (3) on follow-up to the CSCE, and (4) in response to events in Portugal and finishing in turn with Soviet perspectives on (1) West European integration, (2) the condition of the Atlantic Alliance, (3) the stability of their own alliance, and (4) the triangular connection between basic change in Western Europe, détente, and the Left, two things are accomplished: First, contemporary Soviet diplomacy is given greater dimension and, second, a basis is created for evaluating the links (1) among the Soviet Union's underlying concerns in Western Europe and (2) among the longer-range aims that these inspire.

Beyond what Soviet behavior in specific instances tells us about the Soviet Union's broader concerns and what insight these broader concerns give us into

Soviet behavior in specific instances, a third level of analysis is developed in this essay. That is the impact of the Western economic crisis on both the Soviet Union's broader concerns and its behavior in specific instances. Since the disruption of major capitalist economies has coincided with even more radical political disruptions on NATO's southern flank, instability in the West has become a *potentially* powerful distraction for the Soviet leaders. In the first, second, and last of the following four policy areas, I have made some effort to evaluate the extent to which they are being distracted.

I

ESTABLISHING DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH THE COMMON MARKET:
THE PROBLEM OF WEST EUROPEAN INTEGRATION

Two years ago--and sixteen years after its formation--the Soviet Union began quietly and timidly to make contact with the Common Market. It started in the summer of 1973, when Luxemburg's Prime Minister was in Moscow and his Soviet hosts suggested that the time had come to think about a more constructive relationship between the EEC and COMECON. Producing no response, the secretary general of COMECON, Nikolai Fadeyev, was then dispatched to Copenhagen ("only a vacation," he said) to sound out the Danish Minister of International Economic Affairs and the acting chairman of the EEC's Council of Ministers.

It was a confusing initiative, worthy of the equivocation marking the whole diplomatic interlude to follow. Fadeyev refused to say precisely what he had in mind or for whom he spoke. He again hinted that the void between the two economic organizations should be bridged but did not indicate in what fashion, at what level, or in what time frame. Approaching the chairman of the Council of Ministers seemed in itself a further evasion. For, the Council of Ministers represents the Nine as separate sovereignties, and coming to it had the appearance of avoiding the European Commission, the embodiment of the EEC's integration. Hence, the West Europeans responded (in September 1973) that, if COMECON wanted

"to approach the Community," it could address itself to the Commission.¹ Their response added to the confusion. The Soviet leaders thought this was a rebuff and regarded it as additional proof of the Common Market's ill will toward COMECON. For them it was not only a question of the West Europeans' reluctance to get involved with COMECON; it was that the West Europeans had not given up the hope of seeing the process of socialist integration halted and then reversed.³

With such apparent misgiving, to which the Soviet leaders would soon add the conviction that the West's growing economic crisis prevented national leaderships from giving any serious thought to the problem of establishing relations with COMECON, the question is, why did they choose this moment to start a dialogue? The answer can be pursued on two levels--both of them useful, but one is narrower and more typical of explanations that focus on the immediate connections among events; the other is broader and stresses trends or larger concerns as the framework for policy choice. They are not mutually exclusive, unless one makes them so.

The Common Trade Policy: An Immediate Explanation

In early 1973 the Common Market countries announced their plans to introduce a single uniform commercial policy beginning in 1975. Under it, the members would give up the option of separate trade policies and, together, formulate a common set of trading standards. Thus, the Soviet Union would no longer be able to arrange with the individual Common Market countries the commercial regime applied to their bilateral trade. Any such formal provisions would, it appeared, now have to be worked out with the Commission.

Although at this stage the precise outlines of the common trade policy were far from clear, evidently the Soviet leaders found the prospect real enough to justify acting. The signs are twofold. First, the impression that the inquiries

of summer 1973 had directly to do with the trade initiative deepens with the even swifter Soviet reaction the next spring when the EEC declared that final agreement had been reached and that the common trade policy would definitely be in force January 1, 1975. In July, less than two months after the EEC's announcement, the senior Party specialist on Western Europe and Ponomarev's right-hand man in the International Department of the Central Committee, V.V. Zagladin, came secretly to Brussels. He sought out the *Commission's* Director of External Relations, Edmund Wellenstein--no dallying with intermediaries this time--and went directly to the point with a series of specific questions about the implications of the common trade policy. Two months later, Fadeyev extended a formal invitation to Francois-Xavier Ortoli, the Commission's President, to come to Moscow to discuss the issues involved in establishing relations between the EEC and COMECON. And, in February 1975, Wellenstein took a group from the Commission to Moscow to see what the Soviets had in mind.

Somewhat to their surprise, they learned that the Soviet leaders had very little in mind. Paradoxically this is the second sign that the common trade policy had been a direct cause of the year's ambiguous diplomacy. The COMECON representatives were second-level officials and, more importantly, neither prepared nor apparently authorized to carry on serious discussions. The visit was supposedly to arrange for a meeting between Ortoli and Fadeyev but, when the Commission representatives suggested that an agenda be worked out, Soviet delegates seemed uninterested and had nothing better to offer than the loose formulas of the original invitation. They were equally unforthcoming in discussing the exchange of information between the two organizations.

The whole episode suggests that, not only had the Soviet leadership reacted to the common commercial policy, they had overreacted. By the time Wellenstein and his people reached Moscow, the Soviet leaders could see that the new policy

would have no significant practical effect on their trade with Western Europe. They continued to enjoy de facto most-favored-nation treatment. They were not compelled to close their trade missions in EEC capitals--one of the more revealing of their exaggerated fears. They could seek Western investments--so-called industrial cooperation agreements--without even thinking of the common trade policy, for this whole area of East-West economic cooperation is outside it. As a result, whatever urgency they may have once felt to conclude an agreement with the EEC quickly dissipated.

Coming to Terms with the Reality of the Common Market: The Broader Perspective

Much as nervousness over the effect of the common trade policy accounts for the timing of Soviet initiatives, however, it alone cannot explain the shift in basic attitude that made a dialogue with the Community thinkable. Had Soviet assessments of the Common Market not already been changing, a more characteristic reaction to the common trade policy would have been either disregard or sharp public condemnation. Thus, understanding this evolution requires a second, broader perspective.

The change, most analysts would agree, goes back to a remark in Brezhnev's speech to the third Soviet trade union congress in March 1972. The idea that Soviet initiatives in Europe were "directed at laying a mine under the European Economic Community," he said, was "absurd."³ On the contrary, "the Soviet Union is far from ignoring the actual situation in Western Europe, including the existence of an economic group of capitalist countries like the Common Market and its evolution. Our relations with the Common Market members, naturally, will depend on the extent to which they, on their part, recognize the realities existing in the socialist part of Europe, specifically, the interests of the member countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance. We are for equality in economic

relations and against discrimination."

Brezhnev, of course, may have had an ulterior reason for wanting to appear conciliatory at this juncture. The West Germans were in the midst of the debate over ratification of the August 1970 Moscow Treaty and one of the issues on which the opposition kept drumming was the Soviet hope of using *Ostpolitik* to prejudice West European integration. As in the case of the common trade policy, the need to blunt this argument might well have explained the timing of a striking Soviet initiative, but not alone the initiative itself.⁴ For that the Soviet leader had a more fundamental inspiration.

Sooner or later, Brezhnev knew, the Soviet Union had to give up the myth that the Common Market would someday go away or that its most objectionable features were best handled by pretending that someday it might. The Soviet Union, too, has done its share of coping with unpleasant realities by ignoring them and, by the early 1970s one of the more obviously doomed examples was its policy toward the Common Market. It would have been an obstinate Soviet leader, indeed, who by then could not see that whatever little influence his country would have over the evolution of this organization could only be developed by dealing with it directly.

Two events, in particular, shaped the Soviet leadership's changing view of the Common Market. The first was the removal of the last obstacles to British entry, arranged, in effect, during Heath's conversations with Pompidou in Paris in June 1971. The other was the German decision to float the mark a month earlier in May 1971. The first drove home the fundamental vitality of West European integration. The second, signaling as it did a long-term monetary crisis of the EEC, dramatized the reassuring limits to that process. At the time Soviet analysts lingered a great deal over the implications of the Common Market's expansion. An important frontier was being crossed, they seemed to feel, after which the

Common Market no longer remained the partnership of only a small fraction of West Europe--however powerful two or three of these states were. The EEC had finally transcended its original membership. To read Soviet commentary carefully, the significance of this event stemmed from more than the addition of three, possibly four, new members and from more than the adherence of Western Europe's remaining major state. More to the point, they indicated, Western Europe had escaped a permanent split among its major economies. The impressive result, to use their own language, was that a "powerful bloc had been created, possessing the overwhelming part of this region's productive capacity, foreign trade, and monetary reserves."⁵

In contrast, the German decision to break monetary unity and the disruption this caused plans for creating a monetary and economic union by 1980 made the character of West European integration less fearsome. It ensured British entry (Soviet analysts realized this instantly) but, at the same time, it reduced a critical dimension of the threat that British entry represented. For, ever since the December 1969 summit of EEC leaders, Soviet commentary on the Common Market had reflected an extraordinary concern over the "deepening as well as the broadening" of the process of West European integration. To the outsider it seemed like a remarkable overreaction, but throughout 1970 the press had been filled with forboding over the course of the Common Market now that the French veto had been lifted and plans were afoot for increasing the authority of the European parliament, for coordinating commercial policy, and for organizing a monetary and economic union. Never had Soviet publicists written about West European integration with quite such alarm as during the months after the Hague Summit. Even the most insignificant measures were received as portentous compromises with supranationalism. Commentators regularly warned of the slide from these modest schemes to a genuine economic union, then to political unification, and soon to

a new military entity with its own nuclear arm.

In the chaos following the German decision to float the mark, this strange anxiety was forgotten. Gradually, as the short-term disruption of the German action gave way to the longer-term turmoil of an international monetary crisis and this, in turn, to a serious economic recession throughout the capitalist world, Soviet observers rediscovered their faith in the factors hindering the progress of the Common Market. This made it much easier for them to accept what the entry of Great Britain made difficult to avoid accepting.

Both developments, however, represent more than landmarks in the evolution of the Soviet attitude toward West European integration. They also correspond to what has become the dual essence of that evolution. For the peace that Soviet leaders appear ready to reach with the EEC has two premises: The first, that the Common Market will surely persist and, in all likelihood, advance to new forms of cooperation; the second, that the Common Market's advance will not necessarily go in the worst possible direction. Soviet leaders have for several years distinguished between economic integration--which they find natural and now supposedly predictable--and political-military integration which they fear and condemn. This differentiation--this new willingness to live with lesser forms of West European integration on the chance that others need not follow--is inspired by the obstacles that Soviet leaders again trust to impede any significant transformation of the Common Market.

The other key development of 1971, too, has its traces in the contemporary Soviet appraisal of the Common Market. Like the distinctions that Soviet leaders find easier to draw among forms of West European integration as a result of the last four years' economic instability, their perception of Western Europe's current economic plight reflects the strength that they attribute to the Common Market since and, in part, because of British entry. It also provides the first

major illustration of our third-level of analysis. For Soviet observers have asked the question, are the severe economic problems afflicting Western Europe and the other industrialized capitalist states capable of destroying the Common Market? And their response is no. The mere fact that they pose the question so somberly is, of course, worth noting. It says something of the seriousness with which they regard the economic disruptions of the past two years. But the way they answer is even more noteworthy. "Even if some of the stories of the EEC structure collapse," one of them writes, "the process of integration, objectively necessitated as it is by the development of the productive forces, is bound to go on. It may be retarded or take other forms, but it cannot stop."⁶

The Economic Crisis and the Common Market from the Soviet Perspective

Soviet leaders would like the Common Market to be profoundly damaged by the energy and post-energy crises. But they are not letting their preferences distort their analysis of the facts. During the darkest moments of 1974, when the Common Agricultural Policy was in shambles, monetary cooperation shaky at best, and even the internal customs union endangered, Soviet writers were assuring their readers that the Common Market would prevail because it was "objectively necessitated by the development of the productive forces." What a far cry from the aberrant, mean little enterprise that Soviet writers had pretended the EEC to be for most of the period after 1957. When the British drew near the referendum last June, Soviet leaders not only wagered that the pro-Marketeers would ("sad-to-say") win, they--or at least some of the professionals who follow European affairs in Moscow--took it for granted that, even were the British to leave, within five years they would be asking to rejoin.⁷ Here was testimony to Soviet confidence in the power of the Common Market--power that produced and then prospered from British adhesion.

To bring the discussion back to my central theme, much of the answer to the question of how Soviet perceptions of West European integration relate to the practical issue of COMECON's relation with the EEC is in this counterpoint between two dimensions: Between, on the one hand, the reconciliation with the force and permanence of the Common Market and, on the other, the gamble on the obstacles to its very far-reaching political and military integration.

The gamble, however, betrays fears. Admittedly not many of these are great for the moment but they are far from eliminated and, once the abnormally severe disruptions of the last two years have faded, they will surely revive in one form or another. The Common Market may never reacquire the simple, albeit impeded, momentum of the late sixties and early seventies but someday soon it will again appear to have a momentum of sorts. Indeed, even now, when the process of West European integration is less menacing than ever, Soviet publicists are the first to take seriously talk of escaping the paralysis of economic cooperation by speeding the development of political institutions. "With the way forward being blocked, and any retreat threatening a complete break-up of the EEC," Yuri Shishkov wrote recently, "its ruling circles have been groping for some detour, believing that if the Community is incapable of reaching 'Horizon 80' through economic integration and its development into a political union, it could perhaps bypass several stages and get down to reorganizing its political and legal superstructure."⁸

To most Western commentators, the effort to stem the disintegrative effects of the economic crisis by rallying the Nine to accelerated political reform--in particular the decisions taken at the December 1974 Summit to limit the veto within the Council of Ministers, to promote direct elections to the European Parliament, to create a passport union, and to transform heads-of-state meetings into regular consultations--appear artificial and rather insignificant. As Shishkov's

comment makes plain, Soviet commentators also understand the desperation inspiring this recourse. But symptomatically they are less quick than their Western counterparts to dismiss its chance of success. They tend to pause more over the factors that have made it possible to move in this direction, particularly, the Federal Republic's continuing support for political integration and, significantly, what they claim is France's new readiness to go along. And they tend to pay more attention to "those circles" in the Federal Republic, France, and Great Britain who, in their words, "want to convert the EEC into a military-political bloc." As a result, they also tend to treat more seriously the possibility that the Common Market's current difficulties may in fact stimulate a sudden advance in the Common Market's development.

Again, if they were forced to predict at this point, Soviet analysts would wager against this happening. But because they cannot rule it out entirely--Shishkov says, "the future will show just how developments will proceed"--a certain level of apprehension lurks permanently beneath their day-to-day concerns. In turn, this apprehension reinforces a basic ambivalence. The economic crisis of these last two years, for example, consoles them but never removes the uneasiness they feel at the thought of some frightening new transformation coming out of the chaos. Much as Soviet observers preach the irreconcilability of capitalist interests and the irreversibility of the crisis of what they term macro-economic integration (i.e., state-to-state integration), they still harbor fears that events will force the Nine to collaborate more than theory allows or that, where their competitive drives remain strong, micro-economic integration (i.e., the growth of multinational corporations, the internationalization of labor markets, etc.) will be offsetting.

This basic ambivalence, eased but not eliminated by the current malaise, represents the most critical aspect of the Soviet reaction to West European inte-

gration. To us, the British recommitment to membership represents no particular salvation for the Common Market. Indeed, it may turn out to be an impediment on its progress to the extent that the British seize the role of supranationalism's primary opponents. But Soviet observers are inclined to weigh this likelihood against the boost that the British vote gives to Common Market morale and, particularly, against the pressure that the British vote keeps on others who have resisted joining the community. Most of us in the West, including many within the Common Market, tend to view the admission of a country like Greece as a further hardship for this organization. But to Soviet authors the burden of accommodating the retarded economy of Greece does not necessarily outweigh the EEC's absorption of still another European state. And, while most of us stress the growing tendency of members to treat the Common Market as just one more mechanism for dealing with national problems--rather than a transcendent idea to which they are prepared to sacrifice national interests--Soviet analysts also take account of the interdependence already established among the Nine and the prospect that this interdependence will continue to grow.

Understanding the weave of considerations influencing the Soviet approach to the Common Market, therefore, requires that we avoid attributing to Soviet leaders our perceptions of where the Common Market is going. Their optimism is not necessarily so great as often is the pessimism of the Common Market's proponents. They have managed to worry about developments within this organization even when these appear innocuous indeed. This ambivalence seems sure to sharpen once the process of integration again appears to be underway.

Thus, it is not only concern over what the Common Market might become (in the abstract) that pushes Soviet leaders (in the abstract) to come to terms with this organization; their capacity for finding the ominous even in the most benign periods, it seems to me, pushes them on. The setbacks recently suffered by the

Common Market may have reduced the urgency of spelling out an accommodation with this group, but I do not believe that Soviet leaders doubt the eventual need for such an accommodation. All the more so when they can imagine reasonably specific reasons for seeking an accommodation: (1) Whatever direction the Common Market takes, the Soviet Union is likely to be in a better position to influence it if it has a direct working relationship, presumably a cooperative relationship, with Brussels; (2) COMECON, they may speculate, might well profit from the legitimacy conferred by formal relations with the EEC; (3) formal ties with the Commission may seem to be one way to facilitate an increase in East-West economic cooperation; (4) establishing bloc-to-bloc relations with the Common Market may, in their minds, serve to control or to avoid the growth of bilateral contacts between the East European states and the EEC; and (5) the Chinese decision to recognize the Common Market and to accept the model treaty doubtless stirs Soviet apprehension over leaving the Chinese a free hand in any diplomatic arena.

Dealing with West European Integration: General Soviet Strategy

At the same time I do not mean to say that establishing diplomatic relations with the Common Market is the principal issue in designing the Soviet approach to West European integration. On the contrary, Soviet leaders appear to attach primary importance to a general amelioration (or, at least, manipulation) of the political atmosphere in Europe as the best means of containing the process of West European integration. Détente, the principles advocated in its name, the mechanisms designed to promote it, such as the CSCE, perhaps even the forms of (economic) cooperation that are to come from it are all, in part, intended to weaken the pressures for enhanced cooperation among the Nine. Concern over the potential of West European integration may be nudging Soviet leaders toward a

diplomatic accommodation with the Common Market, which, in turn, could well involve Soviet compromises on questions such as the authority of the Commission (and COMECON institutions), the exchange of information between the two organizations, and, most important, the room for bilateral transactions between the individual states of East Europe and the Common Market. But this accommodation does not automatically become the primary means for dealing with this concern. The broader attempt to foster a spirit against inward-looking economic groupings in Europe, to sap the interest in new political or military formations in Western Europe, and to establish in the public eye the value of East-West economic cooperation seems to be the Soviet leadership's principal answer to the challenge of a stronger and more cohesive Common Market.

In sum, we should not treat Soviet policy as only or even essentially the product of the Common Market's immediate ups and downs. A larger Soviet perspective--framed for the longer run, inspired by a permanent fear of a united Western Europe, but confused by ambivalence over the balance of trends at any one time--appears to affect policy more. The decision to recognize the Common Market and to begin working out formal cooperative arrangements has more to do with this perspective than with the short-term failures and successes of the Common Agricultural Policy, the projected monetary union, or the Davignon Committee. If so, then the issue of formal ties tends to be a secondary element in policy, symptomatic rather than essential--the more decisive element being the attempt to control the environmental impulses to integration.

To hazard a guess on the likely course of Soviet policy as a consequence: Soviet leaders will, I think, proceed on two levels. They will, I think, pursue the formal negotiations with the Common Market, accepting disagreeable concessions in order to reach an accord. Most significantly, I think they will face up to the inescapability of endorsing the Common Market as a distinct player in European

politics, the implication of recognition that obviously troubles them most. And I think they will do so under a formula leaving room for a certain degree of direct bilateral cooperation between the Common Market and individual East European countries. The language and the structure of the accords will be designed to minimize or obscure these concessions, but, as a practical matter, I think that they will be made.

Once having granted formal recognition, however, I think that the Soviet Union will keep relations with the Commission as rudimentary as possible. COMECON-EEC contact may be used to upgrade the exchange of commercial information (and the Soviet Union's intelligence on the internal politics of the Market). But Soviet leaders are not likely to make the Commission much of a channel for defining the character and flow of trade. That would not only risk strengthening the Commission unnecessarily, it would also force the issue of COMECON's role in East-West trade, something that neither Moscow nor most of its partners appear to want for the moment.

In fact, the chief "function" of relations between COMECON and the EEC may turn out to be at the second level of Soviet response. Soviet leaders, I think, will concentrate on the vaguer task of promoting a shift in the atmosphere of East-West relations--hoping that this, together with the inherent obstacles to integration, will keep the Common Market from gathering momentum. Second, they also obviously hope that a gradual reformation of atmosphere will dispose Western leaders to a more elaborate economic cooperation with the socialist countries. The relationship, however, is functional. That is, enhanced trade and investment, valuable in itself and a major short-term objective, also serves to reinforce the shift in atmosphere.

Thus, a good part of Soviet effort, I think, will focus on (1) publicizing the importance of the second section of the CSCE's Final Act, reporting every

advance in any way related to this part of the CSCE document, and making the modes and projects of cooperation specified there seem to be the most dynamic and promising dimension of Europe's international economic activity; on (2) seeking accord in economic and particularly in technical-functional areas, in part, for accord's sake--to sustain the public impression of détente's progress in accelerating the East-West "international division of labor" over the "international division of labor" within the Common Market; on (3) developing new areas and new forms of economic, technical, and functional cooperation, particularly, regional forms of cooperation that will look physically like the kinds of cooperation sought through exclusively West European groupings; on (4) enlarging trade and "industrial cooperation" as a primary theme of bilateral state-to-state relations--indeed, as bilateral relations will surely continue as the principal framework for enhancing East-West economic cooperation; and on (5) promoting the general shift in atmosphere associated with détente, here in order to weaken whatever *political* impulse there is to West European integration. Moreover, to the indisputably important degree that Soviet leaders seek these forms of cooperation for their own sake, I think this broader effort is and will remain their central strategy. The establishment of diplomatic relations with the Community will, in the mind of Soviet leaders, make its contribution indirectly and only as a part of this central strategy.

II

MBFR AND THE PROBLEM OF ATLANTICISM

A new tension has arisen in the last half decade between two of the Soviet Union's most basic European concerns. The tension is between the advantages of seeing the Atlantic "partnership" weakened, perhaps even destroyed, and the disadvantages of seeing West Europe's challenge to American primacy lead to

a much stronger Common Market. In the past, there was no distinction in these processes: The Common Market, according to Soviet analysis, was NATO's economic auxiliary. It existed to augment and to coordinate the contribution made by the European states to the alliance. (Hence the traditional American support for a larger and more integrated common market.)

Soviet analysts, as a result, made no effort to discriminate among the effects of frictions with the Western alliance. It was assumed that intra-alliance tension weakened both the Community and NATO. The passions stirred by de Gaulle's refusal to let the British into the EEC, in their minds, helped to disrupt relations throughout the Alliance and, by keeping this "American Trojan horse" out of the Market, made it that much more difficult for the United States to maintain alliance discipline. Or, in the same fashion, they stressed the impediments placed on advances within the Market, for example, by the contest over trading preferences to be or not to be accorded the Americans or by the pressure the Americans put on the Federal Republic to make offset purchases of American arms.

A Shift in Basic Soviet Assumptions

No longer, however, are the implications of intra-alliance frictions so simple. Two important changes have occurred. In the first place, Soviet analysts see tensions between Western Europe and the United States as on an altogether different scale. Before, they studied conscientiously every manifestation of trouble within the Common Market or within the Atlantic Alliance but without ever convincing themselves that the constant discord featured in their analysis seriously threatened either form of cooperation.

By the late sixties, however, the conflicts between Western Europe and the United States (and Japan) assumed a qualitatively different appearance. The

collapse of the postwar capitalist economic order--simultaneously the source and the sign of far-reaching differences among capitalism's three power centers--gave a new coherence and depth to intra-alliance frictions. Japan and Western Europe seemed conspicuously--too conspicuously it would soon turn out--a genuine match for the economic power of the United States. Rivalry at this level, in turn, gave a special impact to the everyday tensions generated by U.S. involvement in Indochina, by the differing approaches to the Middle East conflict after the 1967 War, and by early American skepticism over Brandt's new *Ostpolitik*.

Conflict within the West, according to Soviet analysis, had reached a level threatening the fundamental unity of the Western alliance. The new assertiveness of Japan and Western Europe, the decline of East-West tensions, and the failure of, to use the Soviet phrase, the United States' "aggressive globalism" were regarded as radical new obstacles to "Atlanticism." In fact, by the early 1970s, one Soviet school of thought began arguing that "inter-imperialist contradictions" were now so serious and so irreversible that a fundamental modification of the international order was already underway: What for twenty years had been a unified--though often friction-riven--imperialist camp was at last breaking up into its constituent parts. Because, according to this view, the Americans could not and the West Europeans would not any longer suffer U.S. hegemony, the capitalist world was rapidly fragmenting into three power centers. In the process, came the crucial implication of the argument, imperial America was losing the ability to command the support of Western Europe for its enterprises elsewhere and the subordination of Western European interests to its own within Europe.⁹

Not everyone was willing to go this far. Among international affairs specialists, for example, a number of people disagreed with those insisting that a fatal disintegration was underway. They did not doubt that the alliance would

be plagued with increasing conflict, but they tended to place greater emphasis on the residual cohesion of the imperialist camp. As one of them wrote:

In dealing with the increasing tendency toward ever graver contradictions between the USA and Western Europe, one should bear in mind that at the present stage within the present structure of their mutual relations . . . these contradictions cannot go beyond definite limits.¹⁰

Once the post-1973 energy crisis revealed how frail West Europe's economic power was alongside that of the United States and how dependent this area remained on the United States for economic security, these people found it even harder to believe that the point of no return had yet been reached. (Those who did, on the other hand, stressed Washington's inability to impose a common approach to the energy problem and the tensions generated by the attempt to do so.)

If this dialogue among Soviet academics corresponded to something similar within the leadership, however, the leadership gave no public evidence of it.¹¹ Their analyses of trends within the other camp were usually too superficial to say which side they supported. More than likely they had not made up their minds. Whether Soviet leaders were as convinced as some of the academics that fundamental conflict now dictated the character of Japanese-American-West European relations, however, does not detract from the point being made here: That everyone recognized Atlantic tensions to be of a new magnitude. The disagreement centered on how much of a revolution these tensions had already worked in relations between the United States and Western Europe. Thus, while it was important that some Soviet observers viewed the triangular contest among imperialism's three major power centers as already overriding and met with skepticism from a certain number of their colleagues, it was equally important that almost no one any longer doubted that eventually they would be right.

The second new feature of discord within the Atlantic Alliance touched

directly the new tension in the Soviet Union's basic European concerns. If in the first case the conflicts of interest among the allies were at last great enough to disrupt Atlantic cooperation, they were in this case also unfortunately capable of reinforcing various forms of West European cooperation. For the first time, Soviet leaders were compelled to recognize that frictions between Western Europe and the United States did not have the same effect on NATO and the Common Market. Tensions within the Alliance finally mattered but only by threatening to replace one form of integration with another.

To the extent that Soviet leaders still wished (1) to undermine the fusion of American and West European power, (2) to remove this alliance as one of the critical supports of the United States' foreign policy, and (3) to free developments in Europe from the restraints of this partnership, they had excellent reason to want the West Europeans to be able to hold up their end of the "inter-imperialist contradictions." But, to the extent that holding up their end of the inter-imperialist contradictions required (or led to) a strengthening of Western Europe's economic, political, and military unity, Soviet leaders had quite another interest.

Thus, by the early 1970s, one of the more important assignments of Soviet policy in Europe was to protect the middle ground between extremes: Between, on the one hand, the far-reaching economic-political-military integration of Western Europe and, on the other, the resurrection of Atlantic partnership, perhaps on the basis of new concerns (*e.g.*, economic rather than military security), new institutions (*e.g.*, OECD rather than NATO), and a new distribution of power (*i.e.*, a less preeminent American role). Or, if one believes that Soviet leaders still think enviously of the United States without a strong Atlantic Alliance or Western Europe without a strong United States influence, the challenge was to facilitate the erosion of American-West European unity without stimulating a frightened push

toward integration in Western Europe and to impede integration in Western Europe without exciting a renewed commitment to American-West European unity.

The Impact of the Economic Crisis on Soviet Perceptions

Throughout the recent period Soviet commentators have seemed reasonably confident that a rough equilibrium prevails between trends toward (or away from) "Atlanticism" and toward (or away from) West European integration. In the early phases of the current détente, mainstream analysis appeared to view this equilibrium as tilted toward the disruption of Atlantic cooperation and the growth of West European independence. Once the 1974 energy crisis exposed Western Europe's economic vulnerability, however, the weight of opinion has seemed to shift. Soviet analysts still believe in an essential equilibrium of trends toward and away from extremes but now are more inclined to view this equilibrium as tilted toward a temporary rehabilitation of Atlanticism--based on a greater residual West European dependency on the United States than they had originally thought. As the energy crisis merged with recession, most of them began de-emphasizing the fatal effect on Atlanticism of intra-Alliance conflict and Western Europe's willingness to break with American policy. Instead they stressed more the momentary upper hand the crisis gave the United States in dealing with their European allies. The West Europeans, they sensed, were too helpless to refuse collaboration with the Americans on the issue of energy; even French policy seemed to them more the reflection of frustration and desperation than a real defection from Atlantic cooperation that had any chance of rallying other West Europeans. As the energy emergency deepened into a serious economic decline, the fundamental American advantage became increasingly apparent to Soviet observers. Many of them seemed to be conceding that too much had been made of Europe's (and Japan's) readiness and ability to challenge the United States'

leadership in international economic affairs. If the West Europeans fell short in the only plausible dimension in which they could be said to match American power, then the whole idea that Atlanticism was crumbling under the impact of Western Europe's resurgence was dubious--at least, for the time being.

Over the last year or so, as a result, Soviet observers have been less quick to feature signs of NATO's fragmentation and more inclined to concentrate on reflections of its continuing influence. Thus, by the summer of 1974, the aspect of the Federal Republic's growing economic preeminence within the Common Market that bothered them most was Bonn's readiness to push its Common Market partners into cooperation with the United States on the energy issue. The Federal Republic had emerged from the energy crisis still more conspicuously the dominant economic power among the Nine but, now, disturbingly, with a parallel determination to exercise political leadership. Worse, the Germans appeared to buy the argument of American leaders who urged the "two richest and most powerful members of the Atlantic community" to take the lead in addressing the problems of inflation and energy.¹² Before the December 1974 EEC Summit, Bonn had even tried, according to this account, to intimidate the other eight with "the threat to set up a 'Bonn-Washington axis.'" It was shades of the old realization that the Germans, not the British, were the real "Trojan horse" of American power in Europe.

For similar reasons, Soviet analysts have begun, again, to complain of France's eroding resistance to cooperation with NATO. In the first year after Pompidou's 1969 election, they had manifested an edginess over what the PCF charged was the new leadership's *glissement vers l'Atlanticism*. But this "slide" had not gone far and it was, in any case, soon overshadowed by the rapid deterioration of Atlantic relations in the early 1970s. Now, however, they are once more returning to the theme that France is relenting before the incessant

efforts of "Atlantic circles" to draw her back into the military organization. *L'Aurore* reports, and the Soviet press has for the last year been featuring every such report, "an imperceptible but real resumption of France's attachment to some NATO organizations."¹² The latest straw in the wind is France's agreement in principle to a proposal of the NATO Eurogroup to establish an agency within the Common Market to take charge of the development, manufacture, and sale of armaments. However much the French protest that the new agency is to be outside NATO, *L'Humanité* and the Soviets have seen through the ruse: "For France this means 'reintegration in the Atlantic system.'"¹⁴ All of which proves that the last of the great dissonant voices within the Atlantic camp is gradually being silenced.

The tendency to focus more now than a few years ago on the forces prolonging Atlantic ties has also revived the old image of the EEC as NATO's adjunct. This is how Soviet analysts are treating both the prospect of Greek entry into the Common Market and the Common Market's attempts to keep Portugal from swinging too far to the Left. In the first case, Soviet writers charge that NATO hopes to counteract Greece's break with the military organization by drawing it into the EEC--the implication being that the other members of the EEC remain so much a part of NATO that Greece could not stray far were its economy tied more closely to theirs. In the second case, they also contend that the EEC was doing NATO's bidding when it tried to blackmail the Portuguese Armed Forces Movement into repudiating radical Leninism. The readiness to revert to this second-level interpretation of EEC developments reflects a certain respect for "Atlanticism's" continuing viability.

By no means is any of this to suggest that Soviet observers are once more conceding a fundamental stability to the Atlantic Alliance. But the second thoughts stirred by events since October 1973 illustrate in an important way

the complexity of the context shaping the Soviet approach to arms control in Central Europe. Not even the most encouraging trends are without their dark side. No area of progress is fully liberated from regression elsewhere. The deterioration of the Atlantic Alliance that weakens the imperialist camp is the same process that may turn out to strengthen West European integration. The advantages of seeing American forces pack up and leave Central Europe must be weighed against the risk of provoking the Germans into making up the difference or accelerating West European defense cooperation. The source of the Common Market's current paralysis is the same circumstance again paralyzing Western Europe's will to throw off American tutelage on vital international economic questions. The prospect that this period of last minute weakness will give rise to an even greater determination to defy American dictates carries with it the prospect that Western Europe will emerge equally determined to transform the EEC into a more effective political union. In short, the power adequate to challenge American primacy may generate the power adequate to create the hostile vision of Europe preferred in Peking.

China is the last but least definable factor in Soviet calculations. Obviously the Chinese leaders do not have it within their power to produce a politically integrated Western Europe, endowed with its own independent nuclear deterrent, notwithstanding their praise of the idea. Nor is it within their power to promote a strong NATO until Western Europe is fully integrated, again notwithstanding their desires. This presumably is not what disturbs the Soviet leaders nor is it presumably why they resent Western Europe's high level diplomatic encounters with the Chinese or the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Common Market. Rather, the challenge posed by China stems from the damage that they fear can be done to their own basic political strategy in Western Europe. For, China is a major and unequivocal critic of "détente as a

process." If China contributes to an already jeopardized strategy, not by persuading the West Europeans of their interpretation of détente but by benefiting from the attempt of West Europeans (and, in particular, the Americans), for reasons of their own strategy, to maintain a certain balance in Sino-Soviet relations, then Soviet aims in Europe are diminished. It is China's constant harping on the perils of détente combined with the West's concern for maintaining balances that threatens to prejudice the good work of the last few years and to complicate the process of controlling change in Western Europe.

Policy Objectives and MBFR

Policy has the difficult task of maintaining an equilibrium among these trends or, more precisely, of fostering a stable deterioration of Atlanticism without undercutting a stable paralysis of the Common Market. Ideally, I think, Soviet leaders hope that conflict within the Atlantic Alliance will reach a point seriously eroding NATO as it has been. They would, I think, like to see NATO removed as a source of American leverage over West European foreign policies and as the primary means for fusing U.S. and West European power. And they would like to see it removed as the salient of those who favor the most conservative approach to East-West relations and détente or who have the most trouble adjusting to change in Portugal, Greece, Italy, and elsewhere in Western Europe.

Conflict they also hope, will be severe enough to prevent NATO from transforming itself into or giving way to new forms of Atlanticism. If severe enough, Western leaders will not be able to use the growing challenges to economic security to fashion a new mission for NATO. Nor will they be able to wheel something like the OECD into its place to serve as the basis for a new Atlantic partnership.

At the same time, the objective is to retard West European integration

above levels necessary to keep the United States and Western Europe in conflict and to give Western Europe the strength to stand up to the United States. (A new theme of Soviet analysis over the last three years has been the mounting hostility of American leaders to West European integration.) The line between the two levels of integration, however, is a fine one--if, indeed, it exists at all. Most Soviet analysis obscures the dilemma by refusing to draw that line. Instead in one breath the reader is treated to descriptions of the Common Market's growing capacity for challenging the United States. In the next he is told how much damage will be done to European harmony if the advocates of West European integration have their way. As on so many other occasions, the tangle of trends in Europe leaves the Soviet Union in a "have-your-cake-and-eat-it" predicament.

Take the instance of West European military cooperation: For the last two years, the mild lament of Soviet analysts has been that the Europeans are again momentarily under the shadow of American power. Yet, the same analysts are unable to abide the slightest discussion of improved defense coordination among the West Europeans--even if intended to reduce Europe's dependency on the United States. Thus, when at a moment of frustration following the October 1973 Middle Eastern War, France urged fellow members of the West European Union to coordinate their defense procurement through some agency pointedly outside the control of NATO, Soviet commentators refused to consider the initiative as in any way a blow to NATO or a potentially useful way to promote Western Europe's independence from the United States. It was, in fact, condemned as sharply as if designed to do just the opposite. Defense cooperation is defense cooperation, went the unyielding Soviet response. "However different the concepts of 'European defense' may be," one commentator wrote, "it can essentially only be an appendage of the Atlantic military machine directed by the Pentagon."¹⁵

Nothing redeemed the French proposal from the start and nothing would calm their suspicions once aroused. Later, when Giscard would confess that military cooperation was not the way to build an independent Europe, in part, because the Soviet Union would never stand for it, Soviet concern remained unassuaged.¹⁶ The French, they were sure, would come back to the idea as soon as it had the slightest prospect of success.¹⁷

On this score Soviet opinion was adamant: In the short-run there was no way for the West Europeans to cooperate in defense without enhancing NATO; long before this kind of cooperation could serve to free Europe from the dependency that European leaders imagined they had on the United States, it would already have produced the greater evil of a separate military entity on the periphery of the socialist camp.

Soviet leaders counted on Western Europe's desire for independence to revolutionize the imperialist world; yet, they condemned every concrete step--not only military steps--toward a stronger West Europe. They assured the Nine that they could live with West European economic integration but not political-military integration and then not only made no effort to define the line between them but behaved as though actually none existed.

Finding the links between this broad, semi-shapeless set of concerns and the Soviet approach to the specific issue of MBFR is not easy. Over the last two years the impression has grown among those negotiating in Vienna that the Soviet Union is pursuing three basic objectives in these talks: First to establish controls over the Bundeswehr, second, to establish a *droit de regard* over West European defense cooperation, and third to establish control over the departure of American forces from Central Europe. It would be perfectly consonant with these three objectives to add that MBFR may also appeal to them as an alternative means of attacking the problem of NATO's forward based systems (FBS). With

varying emphases these three objectives appear in the assessments of all the major Western participants in these talks.

On the surface, these objectives--save for the fourth added by me--appear singularly dedicated to containing a greater military effort on Western Europe's part. They hint at little preoccupation with the perpetuation of NATO--except, on the contrary, to imply that Soviet leaders are in no hurry to rush American troops out for fear that their leaving will only lead to a larger and more influential Bundeswehr or perhaps to a more effective defense cooperation among the West Europeans. Viewed in this light, even the FBS issue can be interpreted as an attempt to diminish NATO without necessarily driving the Americans from Europe. It is not so much that Soviet leaders are assumed to pursue these objectives out of a real concern over the prospect of West European military integration as it is that they are assumed to recognize an opportunity to improve their relative power position in Europe, an opportunity that they do not want complicated by more effective defense arrangements within Western Europe.

This, however, may not be the most accurate way to evaluate the short run relationship between the Soviet approach to MBFR and Soviet objectives vis-à-vis NATO (or West European defense integration). In the short run two distinctions are worth drawing: The first between MBFR and alternative paths to their broader objectives vis-à-vis the Western Alliance; and the second between the other roles of MBFR and MBFR's role in promoting their objectives vis-à-vis the Western Alliance.

In the first case I am raising the possibility that Soviet leaders view the MBFR process as incidental to their efforts to influence trends within the Western Alliance. Or, put in more cautious terms, that they assign MBFR a distinctly indirect role.

The suspicion stems from their apparent perception of the way change is

likely to occur in the Western Alliance. Soviet leaders and publicists spend so little time these days discussing the basic drift to events within NATO that a firm picture of their assumptions is hard to draw. But it seems safe to say that they are much less likely to cast change in terms of a rapid disintegration of the military organization than they were a decade ago. Instead they appear to see substantial change as evolutionary and cumulative--the ambiguous outcome of structural shifts in NATO's international setting (*i.e.*, in particular, the decline of East-West tension, the rise of new [economic] security concerns to which NATO is essentially irrelevant, and, as a consequence of these first two considerations, the accentuation of permanent conflict between the Americans and West Europeans).

Here, again, however, the profounder implications of the West's current economic predicament complicate the issue. Until the mounting economic disorder of the early seventies turned into recession and before the 1974 energy crisis curbed the Western powers' increasing taste for confrontation, international economic relations--particularly those among the major capitalist centers--appeared to Soviet analysts as a key stimulus to the kind of structural change in international politics mentioned a moment ago. That effect, however, has been partially reversed by the economic deterioration of the last two years. Although a matter of debate, most Soviet observers seem to feel that, for the moment, the West's economic problems are giving a new lease on life to "Atlanticism." This is Atlanticism in the broadest sense of America-West European collusion in the face of a particular challenge, and no logical reason exists why it should serve to preserve NATO--a largely unrelated institutionalization of Atlanticism. Still, it appears that Soviet leaders perceive the recession as double sustenance for NATO: First, NATO benefits from the absence of any other tested institutionalization of Atlanticism and, second, because great

insecurity whatever its source continues to heighten Western Europe's insecurity vis-à-vis the East.

However, the Soviet leaders presumably expect that once the present deep economic malaise passes, economic relations within the West will again become disruptive. Then, the normal flow of random crises within NATO--such as the dispute over staging facilities during the October War, the Greek-Turkish clashes over Cyprus, and the confrontation between Iceland and Great Britain--will have a greater impact. When synchronized with the general changes in the international context, the spontaneous surprise disruptions of the future will be more powerful than they are now. The Soviet leaders seem far more captured by the prospect that NATO's chief challenge over the next several years is to withstand internal setbacks whose force will be magnified by a shifting international setting than they are by the prospect that NATO can be significantly altered by bargains struck in the diplomacy of East-West relations--arms control or otherwise.

As in the case of West European integration, for the moment, Soviet leaders seem more inclined to pursue their objectives vis-à-vis Atlanticism by trying to affect context than by trying to effect direct change. In the short run, therefore, they are more likely to treat MBFR as a subordinate part of a general policy directed at adjusting the nature and atmosphere of East-West relations than as a mechanism for controlling or eroding the organization of the other alliance. In the longer run, they well may hope to use MBFR to facilitate the withdrawal of American forces from Europe, and to diminish Western Europe's defense. But for two reasons this is not likely to be their immediate over-riding objective.

First, much as I think Soviet leaders cherish the hope of reducing or eliminating the link between American and West European power, they also have no desire to see the Germans pick up where the Americans leave off or the West

Europeans panicked into serious defense cooperation. Second, and more to the point, they recognize that the Congressional pressures for American troop reductions have momentarily dissipated. Similarly so have the trends toward cutbacks among NATO's European members. With a certain surprise, Soviet analysts have acknowledged the determination of most NATO members to keep up military expenditures despite the pressures of economic recession.¹⁸ The most hard-pressed among them may yet be forced to reduce their defense commitments, but so far Soviet observers seem to be more impressed by the Federal Republic's greater spending than by all the talk of budget constraints and, where the talk is loudest, say, in Great Britain and the Netherlands, by their decision, when all was said and done, to augment either overall expenditures or support for NATO.

Thus, this is not the time to seem too impatient to ease American troops out of Central Europe or too determined to reverse West European commitments to NATO.* There is no way of knowing whether Soviet leaders have learned a conscious lesson over the last two decades but they are behaving as though they now realize that attempts to shape the other alliance have a chance when they can piggy-back on trends and very little chance when they force events. For the time being, West European governments are under relatively little pressure to negotiate reductions in Central Europe. Thus, the Soviet leaders would be foolish to subordinate MBFR entirely to the purpose of restricting the other side's military options, *i.e.*, to putting a lid on the expansion of the Bundeswehr, to preempting the possibility of "rationalizing" West European defense (through

* There is, I realize, a widespread view that the Soviet Union does not in fact want American forces to withdraw from Europe. It is based on the inference that the Soviet leaders fear either instability with them gone or the Europeans, the Germans, in particular, filling the gap when they go. Both of which are doubtless Soviet fears but the conclusion drawn from them is naive: It confounds a Soviet interest in controlling the pace and timing of American withdrawals with a Soviet determination to keep them there.

integrated logistics and deployments), or to reducing the American role in NATO. That might be a sensible preoccupation for this decade--not for the next year or so.

Rather than make MBFR bear the burden of their hopes for controlling trends within the Western Alliance, I think that the Soviet leaders prefer at this stage to put greater faith in the corrosive effect of détente. I think that they see détente--to which they would be committed for other reasons in any case--as having the greatest immediate impact on the cohesion, dynamism, and growth of NATO as well as on the impetus toward West European defense cooperation. MBFR, in this case, becomes an indirect or a subordinate aspect of their efforts to promote détente.

This subordination accounts for the rather odd formulation that the Soviet leaders now use to exhort progress in MBFR. They make the proposition of arms control in Europe part of something larger called "military détente" and they contend that political détente should be reinforced by military détente. Indeed, since the conclusion of the CSCE, many commentators have been suggesting that this is now the principal task in Europe.

You do not have to look closely, however, to notice that "military détente" is a larger and looser notion than MBFR. While progress in MBFR is proposed as an element of military détente, it is no more than an element. Like the negotiation of nuclear-free zones in the North or in the Balkans or an agreement to cut defense budgets by a common percentage, it is one of a variety of ways for promoting military détente. That these negotiations are underway and others are not gives MBFR a certain practical immediacy but no overriding priority. Their interest is in seeing the Vienna process contribute to the general change of political atmosphere in Europe. It is not self-evidently to restructure, scale-down, or tilt the European military balance. In fact, arms control as such

may be a relatively insignificant aspect of the Soviet concern; political effect well may be the primary concern and military détente may simply be political détente by another name.

The Soviet Approach to MBFR in Four Steps

Putting the issue in these terms has important implications for the way that we appraise the Soviet approach to MBFR. To summarize these in four steps: First, before the question of Soviet objectives ever arises, the truth is that the Soviet Union appeared in Vienna in the first place on the West's initiative. At the outset its presence was the price paid for a Western presence at a European security conference. Since it was the West that regarded MBFR as the partial solution to its foreign policy problems, particularly, those created within the Alliance by pressures for American troop withdrawals and, since the Soviet leaders seemed more reluctant than eager to make MBFR a significant part of détente, its initial approach to the negotiations was essentially "damage-limiting." This in two senses: First, in the months leading up to the agreement to begin preparations for a negotiation of force reductions in Central Europe and throughout those preparations in the spring of 1973, the Soviet leaders worked to disrupt any linkage between progress here and progress elsewhere, such as in the CSCE. This was leverage they were not going to concede the West if they could help it. Second, and more important for the substance of the talks, the Soviet leaders were determined to prevent the Western powers from using MBFR to ease Alliance problems, since, in particular, the Soviet Union was to provide a large part of the solution. That is, to them, the West's insistence on balanced (in fact, disproportionate) reductions, confined in the beginning to U.S.-Soviet ground forces, must have looked like an attempt to bring relief to NATO by weakening Soviet military power in Europe. The

Soviet Union's counter emphasis on equal percentage cuts applied to all forces and all countries appeared to be designed as much to scuttle the West's principles for MBFR as to take advantage of NATO. And, if from the start the Soviet leaders meant to take advantage--meaning, they meant to prejudice the FRG's future military role or the prospect of West European defense cooperation--the other task still came first.

Nor is it simply a question of sequence: That is, that frustrating the Western attempt to use the talks as a way of relieving intra-alliance anxieties was a task logically preceding any plan for turning these talks to Soviet advantage. Rather, "damage limitation" and the pursuit of gains are permanently parallel tasks. There is more to the point than the obvious truth that in negotiations each party must worry simultaneously about minimizing the other side's success and maximizing one's own (in those areas where it is difficult to pretend that success is the same for both sides). The "parallelism" between damage-limitation and the pursuit of gains in MBFR may have a more troublesome depth than we easily grant. For, in fact, the Soviet leaders may mean it when they contend that an "effective military balance" exists in Europe. Conceivably they are not simply exploiting a handy piece of evidence when they quote all of the last four Secretaries of Defense back to us to this effect. Moreover, if prominent specialists within the West disagree on the state of the balance and on what needs to be done to maintain it, cautious Soviet leaders, too, may be uncertain about their real advantage in Central Europe.¹⁹ In short, the West's determination to rectify the Central European balance has quite different implications depending on whether the Soviet leaders secretly agree that it can stand rectification. Damage-limitation, therefore, also has an altogether different place in the Soviet approach to the negotiations.

The second step in appraising Soviet policy on MBFR flows from what has

already been said. If the Soviet Union's principal concern is with influencing the European political context (rather than with restructuring the European military balance); if it sees the Western powers under no particular pressure to compromise their principles and objectives in the negotiations; and, furthermore, if it senses that its own military position could be jeopardized by any substantial compromise with NATO then chances are the Soviet Union will content itself with a symbolic MBFR agreement intended primarily to give detente a lift.* At this point, rather than struggle to achieve a substantial arms limitation, the Soviet leaders well may wish to set aside the "contest of principles," the essence of the Vienna talks so far, and to work for a purely symbolic accord.

The problem, of course, is to find a formula that allows the two sides to beg the issue of principles. Inevitably a formula that fits the bill will not get arms control very far. Confounding or circumventing the issue of indigenous forces, national subceilings, the range of arms, and, ultimately, common totals can only be accomplished by settling for a very limited agreement: Something like an agreement to cut stationed forces by an equal and insignificant percentage, dressed up with several supplementary (marginal) measures, *e.g.*, a small reduction in NATO's tactical nuclear arsenal, the removal of a certain portion of Soviet armor, and a statement of intent to negotiate substantial reductions for all nations and all forces in the future.

Precisely how this is done (or how different the result looks from the example just given) does not matter. The point is that the Soviet Union may be increasingly tempted to choose a symbolic agreement over something more substantial.

* The term "symbolic accord" is, of course, a matter of opinion. I use the term to describe an agreement that either does not alter the military balance in any meaningful fashion or does not reduce to any meaningful degree the sources of West European insecurity. Such an agreement may well have other advantages or it may be the first step toward further agreements that do alter the balance or do reduce West European insecurity.

The choice, however, will depend on the vitality that Soviet leaders see in détente; that is, whether there is enough life in the process for a symbolic accord in MBFR to have a measurable effect.²⁰

The third step in evaluating the Soviet approach to MBFR is closely related to the second. Détente, the Soviet leaders have said from the start, is a process. Maintaining the process--that is, keeping the flow of East-West agreements underway--turns out to be an end in itself. Their objective is not so much to give coherence to this process, and even less to subordinate it to a conscious design for European security or for a new East-West order. It is above all to preserve the momentum of a process that they hope will (1) aid in containing the changes they fear in Europe and promote those they desire, while (2) undermining those attitudes and practices of the Cold War that *they* find unproductive or inconvenient.

The notion of process, however, colors their whole approach to European politics, including Europe's specific negotiations. Because of it, not merely because of the unyielding complexity of negotiating arms control in Central Europe, the Soviet Union has regularly hinted that it expects MBFR to be a long, multi-phased process, producing a series of partial, incomplete agreements. It is an unnerving prospect for policymakers who prefer to think about MBFR as something to be gotten out of the way. But it fits with the Soviet conception of détente as a process and negotiations like MBFR as the expression and medium of that process.

The more the Soviet Union views military détente as political détente by another name, the broader will be the perspective in which it inserts MBFR. The more it views MBFR as a means of promoting military détente, the more readily will it cast these negotiations as a process within a process. The more it regards followup to the CSCE (to which we turn next) as a troubled mechanism for

promoting the larger process, the greater prominence will it give to military détente. This is no guarantee that it will then feel impelled to move ahead in MBFR. But the more firmly other areas of military détente are rejected by the West, the more will it be left with only MBFR. To restate the second step in our analysis, however, the more intractable the negotiations in MBFR, the sooner will it settle for marginal, symbolic accords. Similarly, the whole chain collapses if détente falters to the point that the Soviet Union comes to doubt any useful effect from the struggle to reach an accord in Vienna. But, then, so does the idea of MBFR.

Only after passing through these first three steps do we arrive at the fourth: The possibility that the Soviet leaders view the Vienna negotiations as a way of altering the *future* European military balance in their favor or, in the first instance, of stymying West Europe's effort to upgrade future defense capabilities. It is logical that they would like (1) to put a lid on the growth of West German military power, (2) to impede improved defense cooperation among the West Europeans, (3) to influence the evolution of the American military presence, and (4) to weaken the forward based systems. To judge from the constancy with which they cling to proposals for national subceilings, equal percentage cuts for all, and, in particular, the inclusion of all systems and all nations, these are, in fact, important objectives for them. Until they trade the prospect of a substantial agreement for a token accord, these will remain central objectives (in roughly the order that they have been listed). Moreover, because they would resort to a token accord to salvage something from MBFR as a process, not to terminate the process, and, furthermore, because a token accord would be designed to circumvent (rather than destroy, much less, concede the "contest of principles"), these objectives will persist so long as the negotiation of force reduction does.

Ultimately, when the Western nations are prepared to compromise the "contest of principles," they will have to make a serious effort to discover which objectives the Soviet leaders can be induced to sacrifice and the price they will pay for those they refuse to concede. This, in turn, requires that the NATO countries rank-order their own long-range objectives in MBFR. Until that is done, they will be in no position to see whether satisfactory trade-offs can be arranged; to see, for example, whether the Soviet leadership will accept the principle of "common ceilings" if they are assured of involving West German forces from the start; or whether they will yield on equal percentage national subceilings if the NATO powers appear genuinely willing to negotiate adjustments in the FBS.

For the moment, however, the Western powers have too little capacity for turning the Vienna negotiations into an urgent search for ways to scale down the European military balance; and the Soviet leadership has too little stake in doing so. The two sides are, as a result, likely to continue to mark time, bestirring themselves to fashion a symbolic accord when and if they decide the *political* advantages merit it. For the Soviet Union, these will have a clear connection with its conception of "military détente." For the West, the connection between a token accord and its longer-term concerns is less clear.

III

FOLLOWUP TO THE CSCE

For six years--ten, if you go back to the Bucharest Conference of 1966--the European security conference has been the centerpiece of Soviet diplomacy in Europe. Until 1972 when the United States (and the Federal Republic) relented, the Soviet leaders had made the appeal for a European-wide security conference their most familiar public objective. Once underway, the Conference continued as the focus of policy, serving, despite the displeasing aims others sought

through the Conference, to give final form to the Federal Republic's acceptance of the Eastern status quo and to enshrine the notion of East-West economic cooperation. Throughout this period, no other idea or project was more the instrument of Soviet objectives than the Conference. None figured more prominently in the Soviet press, the documents of bilateral summits with Western leaders, and the communiqués of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee meetings. Indeed, none represented more clearly the Soviet leadership's conception of what détente was to be and how it was to unfold.

For, the Soviet Union not only conceived détente as a process, it also, in large part, valued that process as an end in itself. Much as its spokesmen dwelt on the notion of an all-European security system and implied that this was the objective of improved relations, they never provided the slightest indication of the shape that it might assume. In fact, they seemed far more taken with the prospect that European security (like détente) could be cast as a process rather than an outcome. In the words of a notable Polish commentator, "Security should not be regarded as an abstract and static thing in itself, but as a dynamic evolutionary process and a function of the existing and developing internal and external ties."²¹

So close were their descriptions of European security and their exhortations on behalf of détente that even on the carefulest reading one blurs into the other. This, I think, is not accidental. (Nor is it only a reflection of Soviet sensitivity to the futility of trying to implement preconceived security schemes.) On the contrary, it corresponds perfectly with the preoccupation that the Soviet leaders, from the start, have had with controlling the political predispositions of Western Europe. Their primary stake has been in (1) reconciling the West Europeans and, in the first instance, the West Germans, to the East European status quo while (2) simultaneously diminishing their commitment to the Atlantic partner-

ship as well as to West European integration. Hence, treating security as a process (rather than a situation) permits the Soviet leaders to deal with security as a state of mind when it is precisely this that they want most to influence.

It is the West Europeans who have the more natural stake in security as a situation. For, it is they who fear the evolving military balance. And it is they who perceive the structures and arrangements of their previous security eroding, what with NATO losing its past cohesion and priority and with the United States disengaging psychologically, and someday, presumably, militarily, from Western Europe. In contrast, the Soviet leaders have no particular reason to worry about the structure of security in Europe or, more immediately, about the cant to the European military balance.

That is why they invested so much in the European security conference. It serviced better than any other mechanism both their short-term objectives and their long-term political strategy. For, in the first place, the Conference was viewed as the occasion for consummating all three of their immediate aspirations: (1) To rally the rest of Europe and the United States to the territorial status quo formally accepted by the Federal Republic in the 1970 treaties. The Soviet leaders, in turn, intended to construe this concession as a recognition of the political status quo in Eastern Europe--or, in their terms, an acceptance of the "postwar reality" in this area, and, in our terms, a reconciliation with a politically divided Germany within a politically divided Europe. This, it seems to me, was the first and by far the most important of their objectives. In this case, however, the Conference was not only *the* moment for binding all of Europe and the United States to the German "settlement" (and, thereby, reinforcing the German commitment), it was also apparently viewed by them as a further and perhaps final chance to do away with the qualifications that the Germans had attached to the 1970 treaty. To judge from their struggle to circumscribe

or to eliminate the provision for the "peaceful change" of frontiers, they had hoped that the Germans would have to relent on the issue in the broader setting of the CSCE. (If so, they overlooked the number of European states, including some of the so-called neutrals, who had their own reasons for keeping open the option of peaceful changes.)

(2) The Conference was looked upon as a unique opportunity to mobilize sentiment in favor of East-West economic cooperation. Rarely would they have such a chance to lobby for the freer flow of trade and capital, for MFN, for credit facilities, and for continental transportation and energy projects. Everyone would be there--the neutrals, the East Europeans, the Common Market, the Americans, and the Canadians. With all thirty-five states looking for relatively non-controversial areas in which to harmonize their views and many of them impatient with the trading practices of the United States and the EEC, the Conference seemed like an excellent place to celebrate the notion of MFN and to paint a picture of an ever expanding trade, of a growing number of co-production arrangements, of partnerships for improving transportation and shipping facilities, of common efforts to save the environment, and of joint medical and space research projects. As in all other areas, the Soviet leaders preferred to keep the discussion as simple as possible. (The West's insistence on spelling out the measures to improve commercial exchange and industrial cooperation--i.e., the provision of information and facilities--was for Soviet representatives one of the Conference's further frustrations.) But, from the start, the Soviet Union made the matter of economic cooperation a key focus of the Conference. Indeed, in October 1969, when the Warsaw Pact countries, sensing the Conference's feasibility, stepped forward with the simplest possible agenda to speed the process, economic cooperation was one of only two items proposed.

(3) Finally, the Conference represented for the Soviet leaders a unique

forum in which to dramatize the changes underway in Europe, changes which they hoped to show were out of character with the mentality of NATO's staunchest supporters or that of the sponsors of an inward looking Common Market--of "little Europe," to use the Soviet phrase. No doubt the Soviet leaders expected the Conference to give a special impulse to the public's waning interest in these "throwbacks" to the 1950s and 1960s.

What is more relevant in understanding the Conference's sequel, however, is its original importance in the long-term political strategy of the Soviet Union. Not only was it the means for pursuing a given set of objectives, it also epitomized the Soviet conception of détente (and European security) as a process. The Soviet leaders never intended the Conference as a single self-contained event. Instead, they seem to have considered it a dramatic juncture in an ongoing process. As it consummated the accomplishments of the post-1969 détente, so would it also prepare the way for new pan-European conferences, new conferences to consolidate each new era of progress and to propel the process onto the next stage, an institutionalized multilateralism, complementing the traditional avenues of bilateral diplomacy. At the same time, the Conference would serve as the example for this "institutionalized multilateralism," tackling problems that lent themselves to agreement, stressing forms of practical cooperation, excising the spirit of Cold War, yet, respecting the differences between East and West.

The specific steps toward this kind of permanent interchange were contained in the Soviet proposals for follow-up to the CSCE. As with the idea of a simple and expediting agenda, the Soviet leaders were interested from the start in machinery to maintain the momentum of contact beyond the Conference. At the June 1970 Budapest meeting of the Warsaw Pact's Political Consultative Committee, they and their socialist allies alluded to a body to be established

at a security conference--a body which at the time they suggested might be the place to deal with the issue of force reductions in Central Europe. The British Labour government also was urging the formation of a permanent commission of European states and, in part, the reference, like other elements in the Budapest communiqué, may have been an effort to meet the various Western preconditions spelled out a month earlier at the Rome NATO Council meeting. Whatever its original impetus, however, the scheme for a permanent organ soon became an integral part of the Soviet program for the Conference. And it remained a Soviet objective--to the consternation of the French and West Germans--during the months of actual preparation for the Conference and from all appearances, throughout a good part of the Conference's long second stage.

Appearances, however, may have been deceiving. The signs are that the Soviet leadership cooled to the idea of follow-up long before the compromise language of the Final Act was worked out. The Czechoslovak proposal, the formula of the socialist countries, never involved an explicit commitment to further conferences. The advisory committee mentioned in the proposal could by consensus call for further conferences of "high officials." But this was a rather indefinite undertaking, which could as easily be used to avoid meetings as to convene them. The Rumanians objected for precisely this reason. They, and the other lesser powers who valued the Conference for the more direct role that it gave them in European affairs (and for the partial protection that it afforded against excessive Soviet bullying), wanted to ensure that the great powers would not be able to schedule meetings when they found them useful and avoid them when they found them inconvenient. Most of these nations supported either the Finnish or Yugoslav proposals guaranteeing regular high-level encounters of all the European states.

Of course the Soviet interest in an "institutionalized multilateralism"

always presumably depended on their success in having it on their own terms. So long as the arrangements yielded no particular leverage over developments within or among the Socialist states, so long as they protected the Soviet Union's total freedom to participate or not, and so long as they were not taxed with the difficult substantive issues under negotiation elsewhere, the Soviet leaders were devoted to regular pan-European summits as one of the most likely ways to maintain the image of détente's progress.

Thus, the more evident it became that the Soviet Union would not have follow-up on its own terms, the more predictable it was that the Soviet leaders would reconsider their stake in the whole idea. The readiness to compromise on this issue noticed by Western negotiators in late 1974 was not merely the inevitable capitulation before France and the Federal Republic's absolute rejection of permanent machinery. More likely the Soviet leaders were launching a retreat forced upon them from the moment the West succeeded in placing the issue of human rights on the Conference's agenda. True, in the early stages, they may have hoped to confine this discussion, isolating it from the other accomplishments of the Conference and putting it behind them once the Conference was completed. But, by the fourth or fifth week of the second stage, they could see that this was not going to happen. Not only were the other participants turning Basket III into an elaborate negotiation, they, or, at least, the major Western powers, were also unmistakably keen to make these issues prominent in any formal institutionalization of the Conference. Indeed, the Danish proposal, presented for the Common Market countries and supported by the United States, stressed as the primary function of a follow-up conference the "evaluation" of the results of the CSCE, including, in particular, compliance with the Final Act's section on "Cooperation in Humanitarian and Other Fields."

When the Soviet Union joined in the non-committal formula eventually adopted, its enthusiasm was doubtless heightened by the afterlife that they

feared for Basket III (and perhaps also by the utility that mavericks like Rumania and Yugoslavia attached to more elaborate forms of follow-up). It would be misleading to imply that the Soviet leaders had lost interest in further "security conferences" or, more to the point, that they had abandoned the notion of détente as a process, with "institutionalized multilateralism" as an important stimulus.* But one has the right to suspect that, all things considered, they were perfectly content with a formula that praised the idea of future multilateral sessions yet, in reality, committed no one to anything.

This evolution in the Soviet approach to follow-up is the essential preface to Soviet perceptions of détente now that the CSCE is over. For, the ambivalence stirred in one case is matched by a comparable uncertainty and hesitation in the second. The current doubts that the Soviet leaders have about trends since the CSCE, in turn, complicate further what has always been an extremely complicated relationship between détente and, to put it crudely, "the condition of empire."

In large part, the original Soviet interest in détente stemmed from the good that they believed it would do the socialist countries and their alliance. Détente, as they fancied it, was to provide two vital forms of assistance:

(1) By solidifying the concesssions in West German *Ostpolitik* and writing these large among all the states of Europe, détente would give the political underpinning to the Eastern status quo sought by the Soviet Union for twenty years.

(The Soviet leaders may well be wrong about this for the same reason that Western states were wrong to assume that their refusal to accept the territorial status quo in Eastern Europe somehow influenced the sway of Soviet power over this region

* The one demand from which Soviet negotiators would not retreat was the inclusion of a general reference to the idea of holding further pan-European conferences. Thus, when the Swedes wrote the compromise formula for follow-up, the "idea" of further conferences was assuredly a part of it.

or the stability of these regimes; but that this is their simple faith seems beyond dispute.) (2) Détente would also, they expected, stimulate a generous economic cooperation between East and West, giving the Soviet Union and its socialist dependencies the practical relief of Western goods, technology, capital, and technique. This was, as coincidence would have it, relief whose need became particularly evident at roughly the same time that the evolution of German foreign policy made it seem accessible.

This tendency to judge détente from the perspective of their needs at home, home being everything East of the Elbe, was particularly true in the European setting. Without denying that the Soviet leaders also had a sharp eye open for ways to use détente to aggrandize Soviet interests or to control change elsewhere, they were, in the European dimension of détente, moved most by its potential impact on their own camp. They still are, I think.

But to understand the way that this bias continues to influence Soviet perceptions of détente, the other half of détente's paradox needs to be acknowledged: That is, détente represents to the Soviet leaders not only important support for the Eastern status quo but an important threat to it as well. By its nature détente menaces the political insularity cherished by the Soviet leaders for their society. The coming of Western entrepreneurs, the parade of social and professional groups, the number of cooperative agreements (even the most superficial ones), and, in particular, the relaxation in atmosphere, all of these features the very essence of the détente that the Soviet Union seeks, inevitably exposes important segments of society to more of the outside world, makes it harder to maintain traditional values like those of "socialist competition," self-sufficiency, anti-individualism, and Party omniscience, and weakens the popular apprehensions and biases that have sustained domestic and foreign policy. The Soviet leaders knew that these risks were written into détente from the start.

In addition, they realized that many political groupings and even leaderships within the West would try to use détente to accentuate this kind of erosion, although at first they may have been overly complacent about their ability to undermine these efforts. To the natural dangers of détente, therefore, they would soon add the conscious determination of many in the West to force them into a freer movement of people and ideas and into accepting a more liberal conception of human rights.

Their response to the underlying risks accompanying détente has been twofold. First, they have emphasized repeatedly that the effort to reduce international tensions does not for a moment diminish the ideological struggle between East and West. Soviet speakers have never spelled out the character of this struggle, that is, its exact stakes, weapons, and battlefronts. But, in the early 1970s, when détente was beginning to accelerate in Europe, it is fair to assume that they were most concerned with maintaining the integrity of their own value-system, particularly, in Eastern Europe. No doubt, in general, the Soviet leaders meant to say (to one another as well as to us) that "we have long defined the world in a way different from that of the West, and we will continue to do so." "We will continue to defend different kinds of political regimes; to prefer different outcomes from political change; and to pursue different objectives in most regions of the world." But, more specifically, they also meant to say, "détente carries with it the contamination of alien ideas--a danger compounded by the explicit policies of various groups in the West--and, therefore, if we are to protect ourselves, we must counter-attack with heightened vigilance and improved ideological discipline." In a way, at this early stage, the ideological struggle was to be waged as much within their own ranks as against their capitalist adversaries. (Later the notion of "ideological struggle" acquired a more offensive or assertive quality and later that is the way it will be

considered in this paper.)

Second, the Soviet Union's intensifying stress on a more perfect union within Comecon was also presumably inspired in part by the search for protection against the erosive effects of détente. True, there are other equally or more convincing reasons for the emergence of the so-called Complex Program in the summer of 1971, providing for a closer coordination of national plans, a greater market integration, and promises of joint investment to mobilize Eastern Europe capital for Soviet resource development and, in turn, Soviet assistance to the less developed sectors of East European economies. Almost surely the frustrations with the economic reforms of the 1960s was one of these reasons now turning the Soviet and East European leaderships in the direction of step-by-step integration based on traditional planning techniques.²² Perhaps the Soviet leaders were also influenced by the apparent acceleration of the Common Market after 1969--the anticipated entry of Great Britain (and others), the plans for monetary and economic union, and the efforts to stimulate the spirit of integration as the Common Market concluded its first twelve-year transitional phase--and they wanted to imply a comparable vitality within the East. But nonetheless the idea of stepping up the coordination of the socialist economies did serve to draw these countries together when many in the West clearly hoped that détente would wear away their Soviet-dominated cohesion. The timing of the Complex Program in July 1971 corresponded with the gathering momentum of détente. More to the point, Soviet commentators openly stated that integration represented "an important element in the struggle against imperialism and its policy of undermining the positions of world socialism."²³

The Next Stage

Détente's setbacks these past two years have disrupted the Soviet Union's

original balance of concerns. In the beginning the Soviet leaders sought a reasonably straightforward set of gains and anticipated a reasonably straightforward set of risks. What *Ostpolitik* had pried loose the CSCE would build into a general political settlement; from the spirit of détente would come both an impulse to East-West economic cooperation and constraints on unhappy transformations like the political-military integration of Western Europe. But, on the other hand, the process that would release these benefits would also risk opening the way to outside interference in the socialist societies. So, while laboring to keep the process moving along as smoothly as possible, the Soviet leaders accepted that as a matter of course they would also need to intensify the ideological watch within their own camp and perhaps brace its cohesion with a more active integration of COMECON. 24

The critical point, however, is that they not only saw these two tasks as essential but as compatible; and they expected both to advance with relative simplicity. In this they have been doubtless disappointed. As things have turned out, it is less that the benefits of détente have been accompanied by an intense Western effort to force changes resisted by the Soviet Union, than that the benefits and inconveniences of détente have become seriously entangled. To illustrate: The Soviet leaders knew from the start, (at least they learned quickly, that the Western powers would seek a range of objectives noxious to them. They also knew that these objectives would be sought in part by tying their achievement to progress in areas of greatest importance to the Soviet Union. They knew, in short, that the West would succeed in effecting a link between the good and bad sides of détente. But the prospect to which they apparently clung was that of driving a favorable bargain. The challenge was to come away from the Conference with a version of Basket I (that is, a set of principles) underwriting their conception of inter-European relations and to

pay for it with the fewest possible concessions in Basket III.

The problem is not that they fared so poorly, although rather predictably, theirs was something less than a full victory. Rather the problem is that, once struck, the bargain has not flourished. Instead the Soviet leaders have been left alone to defend it--that is, to provide the bargain enough status to give their end of it value. For, in the immediate wake of the Conference, they have suddenly grown apprehensive that the real danger comes less from overbearing efforts to implement the third basket than from a tendency--which they no doubt regard as calculated--to ^{deprecate} depreciate the Conference itself. They are not taking lightly the readiness of many in the West to make an issue of "human contacts" and the freer flow of information. But, for the moment, the focus of their analyses is on the vast range of commentary disparaging the results of the CSCE.

When Soviet analysts write about developments since the Conference their attention is more and more taken with answering the charges that the CSCE benefited only the Soviet Union, or that it has caused the West Europeans to lower their guard and contributed to the disintegration of NATO, or that it has eroded the balance on which the security of the small and neutral European states rests, or that it is a meaningless deception in view of the Warsaw Pact's continued military build-up.

These attempts to discredit the Conference, they suggest, go hand-in-hand with a disturbing willingness to let the critical provisions of the Final Act, namely the charter of principles, sink quietly from public view. There is almost a pained tone to the analysis: You constantly implied that we were the ones who would bury those parts of the Final Act that we did not like; but it is you who refuse to talk about the accomplishments of the CSCE, who make no effort to convert it into something on which to build. Worse, it is you who appear intent on

suppressing (and some, on repudiating) the most crucial contribution of the Conference--the elaboration of a set of principles governing relations among European states.

Lamenting the efforts of "opponents of peace and détente" to "minimize the significance of [the Conference's] decisions and to sow doubt as to whether there is any need to carry them out," one writer has gone to considerable lengths to elevate the Final Act to a status equal to international treaty law.²⁵ His essay is an elaborate retort to "pseudo-learned exercises in legal pettifoggery," which seek to diminish, in particular, "The Declaration of Principles Guiding Relations between Participating States," and which would leave the impression that these provisions are at best mere "declarations of intent and pious wishes on the part of the participants in the Conference." Not so, he is at pains to show. Because the document is worded "in a form close to the usual wording of international commitments" and because it incorporates "so many stipulations calling for observance," it amounts to an obligation no less powerful than the principle of *pacta sunt servanda* in international law. If this be the case, who would dare dispute the Final Act's "weighty political significance and moral force," who would question its role as the "Charter of European Peace?"

All of this creates a rather confusing picture. Far from the Conference advancing the process of détente, the deterioration of détente is diminishing the Conference. The Soviet leaders are helpless to turn the results of the Conference into a basis for their continuing diplomacy when they must first rescue these results from near dishonor. So, for the moment, the CSCE, follow-up to the CSCE, détente as a process, and "institutionalized multilateralism" all mark time.

As the Soviet leaders are certainly aware, the situation is not likely to improve in the near future. The Conference can only contribute to the momentum

of détente if détente already has a minimal momentum, and this it no longer has. The Conference and its sequel are the victims of the harsh reception currently reserved for détente in most Western domestic settings. The politics of succession now upon the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Federal Republic simply accentuates the tenuous place of détente in the commitments of national leaderships. For, in fact, ever since the original breakthroughs of the German treaties, the Berlin accords, and the SALT agreement and from the moment the designs of national leaders were returned to the arena of domestic politics, the (Western) proponents of détente have been on the defensive. Partially this owes to a natural let-down following the rapid movement of the early seventies; partially it is a predictable interlude during which the participants catch their breath and read the fine-print of closer relations; partially it reflects the rise of other preoccupations, many of them economic with few solutions in Moscow; but, in part, it is also the repressive effect of controversy. Détente has become a major political issue and it will become more so in 1976.

Thus 1976 is a transitional year. National leaderships will be distracted by elections or, in the case of the Soviet Union, by political succession. In these circumstances, even were the continuity of Soviet leadership no issue, Moscow would not be likely to choose this as the moment for ambitious new policy departures. Better, they are presumably concluding, that the coming months be used for stocktaking.

The result can be judged in two dimensions. In the near term, that is, over the next year, the Soviet Union is likely to confine its efforts to securing the accomplishments of the last few years and then to wait watchfully for the Western nations, particularly, the United States, to begin sorting out their foreign policy confusion. Depending on the outcome of the elections in the United States and the Federal Republic and depending on the course of the

repressed and haphazard debate over détente, in the somewhat longer-run, the Soviet Union may then either (1), again, assume the initiative for giving détente the appearance of momentum or (2), if faced with hardline administrations in Washington or Bonn, resign itself to random successes with a limited range of Western states (reducing détente to a rallying cry against the recalcitrant).

Policy in the Short Run

To push the speculation somewhat further: In the near term, the Soviet leaders are likely to concentrate on three things. *First*, it seems obvious that they will try to give as much resonance as possible to the achievements of the security conference. The Party Congress is always the occasion for tallying the successes of the last four years' foreign policy, for proving that the Party leadership has had a coherent notion of the world that it is trying to fashion and has systematically implemented it. In the claims made for the so-called "peace program" of the Twenty-Fourth Party Congress (1971), Soviet commentary is close to insinuating that the leadership has successfully converted foreign policy to the five-year plan. No item in the "peace program" offers better proof of the leadership's ability to anticipate and then to bring to pass a coordinated progression of steps toward basic objectives than the German treaties, the Four-Power Accords on Berlin, capped by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Indeed, the initial significance of the Conference will be to drive home the leadership's mastery of international events.

By the same token, however, they are then compelled to present a new "Five-Year Plan" for foreign policy. And Europe, having been the prize example of the Plan's (the "peace program's") accomplishments, will presumably be the object of further projections. Almost certainly the appeal of progress in Vienna ("make military détente a significant new area of progress") will be one of them.

Brezhnev's recent reference in Warsaw to additional "pan-European conferences" on environmental protection, transportation, and energy probably signals another. These and additional ideas, however, are not likely to be blown up into a comprehensive political agenda. The ambiguous status of détente almost surely ensures that they will remain modest, disconnected, and, for the time being, largely rhetorical.

Second, because the Soviet leaders have no stake in seeing détente deteriorate further, or this deterioration become self-sustaining, they will presumably exert themselves to find (marginal) ways of reassuring the West Europeans. They are not in a mood to make substantial concessions in the MBFR negotiations nor are they going to become suddenly forthcoming on Basket III. But they are likely to strive to fulfill the strict letter of the Final Act. They will, for example, take care to notify the Western powers of military maneuvers covered by the agreement on so-called "confidence building measures." (Since, according to the Final Act, notification is purely voluntary, their good-faith will seem all the greater.) They will presumably make a conspicuous effort to provide a good many of the facilities and forms of information called for in the sections on commercial and industrial cooperation. They will doubtless come forward with a wide array of projects addressed to the sections on cooperation in science and technology, environment, and transportation. And they are even likely to try to seem cooperative in fulfilling the provisions for improved "human contacts," "information," "cultural exchange," and "educational cooperation," concentrating on those areas that seem the safest to them.

Similarly, Soviet publicists have made it a constant theme of their commentary that there were no losers at the CSCE, only winners. This soothing message, which they will certainly continue to feature, represents an important line of defense against the widespread allegation in the West that the Soviet Union

was the main gainer in the Conference. If the Conference is not to be reduced to insignificance, or even to an impediment on further progress, they realize that they must convince Western publics that they too have a stake in its accomplishments.

Third, the Soviet leaders will continue to man their defenses against the mischief that they assume Western forces intend under the third basket. As expected, any reference to the commitments of this part of the Final Act are always accompanied by an equally prominent reference to the rights of a state "to determine its laws and regulations." (It is as if Soviet negotiators had never waged and lost the struggle to spell out this principle, and only this principle, in the forward to Basket III.)²⁶ The Soviet leaders are determined, however, that the qualification be bonded to the commitment. The idea is to guarantee that none will be able to invoke the provisions of Basket III without automatically recalling the limitations attached by the Soviet Union. Lest that seem mere obstructionism, the Soviets also regularly plead their dedication only to the sharing of information or the promotion of exchanges that foster peace and good relations; far be it from them to join in the dissemination of ideas antagonizing nations and disrupting the tranquility of their relations. (Again, it is as if the Soviet negotiators had succeeded, not failed, to subordinate the clause on the flow of information to the purpose of promoting peace.)

To strengthen their case, virtually every Soviet analyst implies ^{that} while the Soviet Union openly propagates the Conference agreements and intends to observe them "in strict conformity with the spirit of the document," the Western nations have been much less straightforward, ^{and} much less eager to publicize the whole range of the Conference's results than they are to seize on certain of them to defame the Soviet Union. The Soviet fear, Georgi Arbatov has confessed to readers of the *New York Times*' Op-Ed page, is that "the organizers of the present campaign"

want to "distort the agreements reached in Helsinki and, by laying more and more claims on the Soviet Union, to make it appear as if the Soviet Union is violating these agreements." "This," he says, "will lead to a questioning of the validity of the agreements and of détente as a whole."²⁷

The fear is linked to another taking us back to an earlier point. For, it is not merely that the disparagement of the Conference undermines Soviet gains (or that an aggressive interpretation of Basket III is supposedly intended to prove Soviet bad faith and thus, to discredit the Conference). The Soviet leaders are apparently apprehensive that the Western powers will try to keep them a hostage of the Conference. That is, they suspect that Western leaderships, willfully or subconsciously, on their own or under pressure from various groups at home, will try to turn the Conference into a basis for future compensations. By casting the CSCE as an unfair Soviet success, they, the Soviet leaders sense, will demand repayment in the next stages of détente. In the short-term, this, too, is an inclination that they want to nip in the bud and much of their public diplomacy will be directed to doing so.

Policy in the Longer Run

In the slightly longer range, Soviet policy will depend to some extent on the outcome of the elections in the Federal Republic and, particularly, in the United States. If either electorate swings behind a candidate who rejects the previous terms on which détente has advanced and who ups the concessions demanded in Vienna, SALT, and Basket III, for economic cooperation, and from "multilateral summitry," the present Soviet course is likely to continue, although perhaps furnished with a more systematic strategy. Present policy is essentially low-keyed, committed to countering efforts to turn détente against the Soviet Union, willing to watch events drift, and devoid of particular schemes for moving the

process along. Faced with a Reagan or, perhaps, a Jackson, or, less significantly, a conservatively-inclined CDU-CSU Government, this approach well might acquire the character of a more coherent strategy, a strategy that might be called "fragmented détente."

Accordingly, the Soviet leaders would concentrate on improving relations with national leaderships more amenable to their definition of East-West détente, trying, in the process, to isolate the Americans (or the Germans), and using the idea of détente as their means. A strategy of fragmented détente would be neither a repudiation of détente nor a retrogression to the politics of the fifties and sixties. But it would be détente applied in a way reminiscent of earlier strategies, strategies of indirection, designed to cope with obstruction by circumscribing it, and ready to use ideas (such as détente and its corollaries) to wage the fight rather than to seek a genuine interchange.

If the challenge is not new leaderships matching the Soviet Union's worst fears, the next phase of Soviet policy will probably unfold quite differently. Much will depend on the attention that Western leaders feel they can spare their *Ostpolitik*. Even more will depend on the restored preeminence of the next American Administration in the design and execution of U.S. foreign policy. But, assuming some improvement in both respects, Brezhnev's successors are likely to be interested, again, in the "process of détente." Their original reasons for proclaiming themselves the sponsors of a step-by-step revision of the European contest remain. (1) They still want to provide the least favorable context for West European integration and the context most favorable to the fragmentation of the Western Alliance. (2) They still want to ease Western Europe's passage from American tutelage. (3) They still want to have access to the Federal Republic's future within NATO and the Common Market. (4) They still want to encourage the expansion of East-West economic cooperation. (5) They still want to keep

their Western front tranquil (and will as long as their Eastern front is not).

(6) But, most of all, they still want to enlist the West in their permanent struggle to preserve the cohesion and stability of their own alliance. Nothing quite so much as the idea of détente permits them to pursue as many of these objectives as directly and as fully.

Moreover, neither the direct costs of détente nor the opportunity costs have yet been established. That is, in the first case, the Soviet leaders still do not know how corrosive détente will be within their own society and camp. Détente has been too troubled and ambiguous to pose clearly the challenges of a long, stable interaction. And, in the second case, they do not know for sure what it is that they are giving up in settling for détente. It may be that the easing of tensions in Europe makes it harder to orchestrate the behavior of the non-ruling Communist parties of Western Europe, but that is not clear, and it is even less clear that orchestrating the behavior of West European Communist parties as such is meaningful outside the context of orchestrating it to control détente. More plausibly détente might get in the way of, say, active efforts to influence the course of Yugoslav politics after Tito or, say, a militant exploitation of political and economic instability in Western Europe, particularly its southern half. But, again, it is not obvious that the best approach to Yugoslavia is incompatible with the pursuit of détente; it is even less obvious that a militant or aggressive approach to change in Western Europe is an option at all. But that is the subject of the next section.

Thus, provided a minimum of opportunity, the Soviet Union can be expected eventually to rekindle its efforts to give a certain rhythm and structure to détente. We should not be surprised if, after several transitional months, the Soviet Union again steps forward with a "program" for détente's next phase. Although this time without a centerpiece like the security conference, it is likely

to involve a good deal of multilateralism. Perhaps the Soviet leadership will begin working for a series of conferences such as those suggested by Brezhnev at the last Polish Party congress on energy, the environment, and transportation. Perhaps they will return to Khrushchev's earlier penchant for East-West summitry, only this time with the participation of major East European allies. They are, yet, likely to press for a new pan-European conference when the time comes, hoping to keep it as unencumbered and good-willed as possible. They will almost surely try to give their regularized high-level encounters with the French, the Germans, the British, the Italians and others the aura of a new stage in East-West communication. They well may develop a mild enthusiasm for new agreements, marginal, expeditious agreements (say, in Vienna), intended to convince the other side--in particular, its publics, legislators, and media--that détente is tangibly alive. And, accompanying whatever range of proposals the Soviet leaders decide on, Soviet public diplomacy--the press and the speeches--will exhort and promise a new momentum to the process of détente.

IV

PORTUGAL, DETENTE, AND THE PROBLEM OF FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN WESTERN EUROPE

Although it has been a very special distraction, Portugal remains but part of a complex of trends challenging the political givens in Western Europe and confusing the setting in which détente proceeds. To grasp the significance of Portugal in East-West relations, one must try to place it among the other dramas facing Western Europe. One of these is the ascendance of Communist parties in Italy, France, and potentially Spain, hence, virtually the whole of Latin Europe. The other is the economic recession that has settled on most of Western Europe. All three developments are intertwined. Each creates a part of the general, rather involved perspective from which the Soviet leaders view any one of them. Any one of them, thus, will be partially misunderstood if treated in isolation.

With this in mind, we will advance toward a consideration of Portugal and Soviet policy by way of these other two circumstances. For, the issue of a recrudescence of Left in Southern Europe arises several years before the Portuguese Revolution; therefore, it ^{was} already a major consideration when that Revolution ^{came} along, and it ^{will} continue to grow in salience once the urgency of Portugal fades following the events of this past November. In more modest terms, the same can be said of Western Europe's economic crisis. It emerges after the Union of the Left is formed in France and the PCI has begun to gather steam in Italy. It impinges less on the Soviet response to events in Portugal than do developments in West European communism. And it promises to divert the Soviet leadership less than the question of the Left in Italy, France, and Spain in the future. But, still, it helps to give a particular quality to the context in which the Soviet leadership encounters the Portuguese Revolution. After introducing the question of French, Italian, and Spanish communism in Soviet policy and before going on to discuss Portugal, we will come back to this second dimension of fundamental change in Western Europe.

The Rise of the Left

The sequence among these three developments does not matter. (It is only to simplify the analysis of their effects that they are presented chronologically here.) If anything, it is their overlap that counts. Thus, in April-May 1974, in the first weeks of the Portuguese Revolution, and at a point when the depth of the West's economic slump was only beginning to become apparent, the Soviet leaders found themselves face-to-face with the prospect of a victorious Left in a major West European country. Their apparent feelings about the Left winning power in France in the May Presidential elections tell us much about immediate policy concerns. These had a good deal to do with the deteriorating economic

conditions in places like France and Italy.

It cannot be proved conclusively, but the signs are that the Soviet leaders preferred to see François Mitterrand, the candidate of the Left, lose to Giscard d'Estaing. They never said so publicly (as they had virtually in 1965 when Mitterrand's opponent was Charles de Gaulle). But no one--from the Quai d'Orsay to the French Communist party--doubted it. The only thing they had to go on was a much publicized visit that the Soviet ambassador paid to Giscard between the first and second rounds of the election. All, however, including a miffed PCF, regarded this as a token of support for the future President--in an election where victory would be by an eyelash.

Out of this act, analysts of every sort manufactured a general case for the Soviet Union's opposition to a victory of the Left. Some stressed the dangers of the setting: (1) that victory could come about only in conditions of considerable economic chaos and this (for reasons that will be discussed in the next section) was not something that the Soviet leaders relished; (2) that the Left in power in France would sorely distress the Germans and the Americans whose reaction could not be predicted; and (3) that a victorious Left, dominated by Socialists sensitive to the suspicions about the PCF, would have to bend over backwards not to appear to be doing the Soviet bidding.²⁸ Others thought that Soviet reservations stemmed from their mistrust of the PCF's socialist allies or from a simple desire to avoid major, potentially destabilizing, change at a time when the environment already appeared too unsettled.

The only direct evidence that the Soviets--at least some among the more sophisticated--were reluctant to see the Left win comes from the comments of a senior Soviet specialist visiting Paris at the time of the elections. Yuri Rubinski is the principal French specialist at Inozemtsev's Institute of World Economy and International Relations and, indeed, the most prominent academic

authority on French politics in Moscow. He travels a good deal to France, writes frequently on the subject for both the central political press and the more specialized journals, and, from time to time, contributes commentary on the state of Franco-Soviet relations to French newspapers.²⁹ In May he was saying to acquaintances in France that he feared the conditions "were not yet ripe" for the Left. As he explained, first, the success of the Left in France might serve to push German politics to the right. (These were the days of the Guillaume affair and Rubinski made it plain that the Soviet Union's first concern was with the direction of German politics.) Second, he maintained that, given France's current economic plight, the Socialist and Communist coalitions would soon collapse or, at a minimum, its policies would be plagued by difficulty and failure. In either case, the way would be reopened for the Right and France's Left option foreclosed for the foreseeable future. And, third, he confessed to an uneasiness over the disruption of East-West relations that might be caused by a change of these proportions in a country as important as France.

Rubinski's analysis is, of course, not far from the speculation of many French observers. Whatever the precise reasons, therefore, the Soviet leadership well may have been content to see the Left defeated. It did not really matter whether they were deterred more by the unreliability of the PCF's increasingly powerful socialist allies than by the troublesome effects that a triumphant French Left might have on East-West relations; or more by the uncertain political consequences for German politics than by the destructive burdens of leadership in a period of economic difficulty. The point is that in the short-term immediate policy considerations left the Soviet leaders unenthusiastic about a French government composed in any fashion by the French Communist party. But not merely in France, in Italy, too--first during the governmental crisis in the fall of 1974 and then in June with the PCI's

successes in the regional elections--the Soviet leadership seemed distinctly uneager to risk the effects of a successful *compromesso storico*. Here they were not different from their Italian friends who also regarded a full-blown economic recession as a poor moment to prove the merit of the Party's program and leadership. And, perhaps, they were also reluctant to test the sincerity of the American Secretary of State's concern about an Italian government with communist membership.

But, if Soviet hesitancy grew out of prevailing circumstances, judged primarily against the immediate needs of policy, two large qualifications are worth noting. First, while Soviet policymakers were for the moment evidently opposed to the entry of the PCI and the *Union de la gauche* into government, they were far from opposed to seeing the two parties gather momentum. The difference is between the PCI and the French United Left as an alternative to power and the two as a constraint on the governments that already wield power. To judge from their general praise for the programs of the two groups (their criticisms will be dealt with later) and from the satisfaction taken in reporting the electoral advances of both, Soviet policymakers rather valued the limits placed on Paris and Rome's freedom of maneuver by a formidable challenge from the Left. In fact, one commentator said as much: "Wherever the Communists and their allies win a large size of the vote in elections, sometimes as much as one-half, the ruling circles of the bourgeoisie have to pursue a foreign policy meeting the demands of the democratic opposition in order to stay in power."³⁰

Second, none of what is being argued implies that the Soviet leaders are *fundamentally* opposed to Communist-dominated or -influenced governments in France, Italy, or Spain. Because of the way circumstances are configured, they temporarily have excellent reasons for not wanting West European Communism to succeed too completely. But that is the current configuration and, if it changes,

conceivably so will the Soviet perspective on these two parties as "an alternative to power." If the ill-winds of recession diminish, if the French Socialists and Communists settle their differences, and if détente seems capable of enduring the ascent of the Left in France, Italy, or Spain or, alternatively, if détente no longer seems worth the sacrifice, the Soviet leadership well may change their minds.

It is important, for example, that they (evidently) preferred Giscard to Mitterrand because of the negative effects that they feared from Mitterrand's victory not because of the positive advantages of Giscard's. In the past the Soviet Union supported de Gaulle and his successors, over their opponents, including those sponsored by the PCF, because, all things considered, Gaullist foreign policy was more advantageous. But when Jacques Chaban Delmas lost in the first round of the May Presidential elections, Soviet analysts stopped pretending that this would any longer be the case. Indeed, if other considerations are set aside, logic and much of Soviet commentary suggests that the Soviet leadership would prefer the likely foreign policy orientations of the Southern European Left to that of the current regimes in Paris, Rome, and Madrid. On the whole range of basic issues--from the development of the Common Market to the future role of NATO, from the problem of arms control to the prospects for East-West economic cooperation--they almost certainly sense that the positions of the PCI, the PCF, the PCF's increasingly nationalistic socialist allies, and even the PCE would be superior to prevailing policy. In short, it is perfectly possible that at some point the Soviet leadership will decide that having the Left in power offers the best chance for effecting the kinds of change that they want to see take place in Western Europe.

True, there is the other side of the coin; the PCI, the PCE, and now increasingly the PCF as well defend notions of socialism and its preparation

that the Soviet leaders find difficult to swallow. But this is an entirely different dimension of the problem and it will be interesting to see how the Soviet leaders choose when they have the choice: When the issue is no longer whether external considerations (such as the impact of an economic recession or concern over the drift to German politics) outweigh the advantages to Soviet policy in Western Europe of having the Left in power; but whether the advantages to Soviet policy in Western Europe of having the Left in power outweigh the strain put on "proletarian internationalism" by their deviant conceptions of socialism. In short, whether the returns to policy toward the other camp are worth the challenges to orthodoxy in your own. These are issues to which we will return after we have looked at the other two key parts of the picture: The significance of Western Europe's current economic difficulties and the effects of the Portuguese Revolution.

Western Europe's Economic Recession

As the rise of the West European Left has two dimensions for the Soviet Union, so does the deterioration of West European economies. But where these are short and long run in the first case, they are of magnitude in the second. That is, the basic Soviet concern in the case of the West's economic recession is with the sharpness and depth of the crisis. Virtually no Soviet commentator or leader has expressed any interest in a sudden and complete collapse of West European economies. About the implications of a long-term slump, with low growth rates, renewed inflation, and high unemployment, however, there is apparently less accord.

In the spring of 1974, when it first dawned on the Soviets that the recession was serious, commentators of all persuasions seemed horrified by the thought of a genuine economic disaster. Sluggish and troubled economies were one

thing; the bottom falling out, quite another. Even the most dogmatic among them could see that a full-fledged depression held no advantages for the Soviet Union. Not only would it destroy any hope of a lucrative economic cooperation with the West; it would quite probably send Western politics spinning off in untoward directions. Memories of the thirties persist. The more often Soviet writers evoked the earlier era to say the present was different, the clearer it became that they still found frightening the prospect of great economic instability giving rise to dangerous political instability. And in between these two concerns was the unanimous apprehension that extreme economic hardship turned these societies to the Right--not the Left but against the Left. The ultimate menace they wrote of in this period was fascism, that is, a sharp swing toward conservative parties. When the economic pressures grow severe, then, as one of them put it, the "longing" among "certain groups" increases for "a 'strong hand' capable of coming down on the working people."³¹

The question of a longer but less traumatic crisis, on the other hand, has stimulated a more complicated response. This is not easy to describe. It is, for example, difficult to determine how much of the differing emphases among various analysts reflects conflicting assessments of the West's economic crisis from which they are drawing conflicting implications for policy. And how much simply reflects different but not necessarily conflicting concerns. For example, academics and correspondents who deal primarily with the course of Soviet-German relations or the issues of arms control have a different range of factors to consider from those who deal primarily with the strategy and tactics of Western communist parties. These differences, however, do not necessarily imply basic disagreement over the character of fundamental change in Western society or over the proper strategy for influencing it.

Similarly, it is difficult to identify with assurance the spectrum of

view within a category of analysts (say, among international affairs specialists, foreign policy functionaries, ideologues, or the scribes of the "world revolutionary process" collected around the organ *Problemy mira i sotsializma* and the Institute of the International Workers Movement). No doubt contrasts exist but it is virtually impossible to fashion from these schools of thought or "political camps."³²

It would be remarkable if Soviet observers did not disagree over one or another aspect of the economic problems now gripping the West European countries. It would be even more remarkable if areas of interest and personal bias did not lead to contrasts in tone and stress. But these contrasts need not be taken as proof of a continuous debate among contending factions. They may only be evidence of an ultimately reconcilable range of emphases. In which case Soviet policy is not so much the product of a political contest among different and competing views as it is a reflection of different preoccupations. These preoccupations merge in the leadership (and within any one leader). Some may be more inclined to stress this or that consequence of policy, this or that opportunity of policy--because of personal bias or areas of interest. But they do not introduce competing orientations so much as they seize upon different implications of policy, tempting rather than forcing the primary leaders to consider problems like that of the West's economic crisis in several dimensions.

This is the perspective that, on balance, I find the most convincing. Therefore, the range of view that I am about to summarize is to be understood as several shades of a common political mind, rather than an account of warring camps. It is also something of a simplification of the diversity to be found at each level. Thus, to say that those who were the tardiest in recognizing the recession's strength are those who have granted it the smallest place in their perspective on *détente* and Soviet policy in Western Europe is to reduce a variety

of analysis to an essential spirit. The reference is to most of the foreign policy specialists at Moscow's major international affairs institutes and to the foreign affairs analysts of the central press. Still, while there are exceptions to which we shall return, it is fair to suggest that the bulk of writers in these two groups have been the least distracted by the revolutionary implications of capitalism's "deepening general crisis." In a sense they are creatures of their own expertise: They know the complexity of the societies they study too well to fall into the trap of primitive Marxist analysis at the first sign of economic disorder. They are too sophisticated to be seduced by simple, sweeping conclusions about the basic momentum of trends. Maybe they have also been too caught up in the statistics and analyses of Western economists, which is their stock in trade, to ask their own separate set of questions. But whatever the effect of expertise, it accounts only in part for the specialist's accommodation with the recession.

The tendency to downplay the significance of this development may also derive from the specialist's intellectual stake in détente. For they, more than any other group, have developed the assessment of international relations within which détente is justified. They are the ones who have explained the forces compelling the Western powers to abandon aggressive foreign policies or "positions of strength" strategies and to embrace the Soviet formula of peaceful coexistence. And they are the ones who have calculated the promise and the durability of this new era. The recession came along, if not as a contradiction, then as an awkward diversion. At a minimum it has drawn Western leaders away from the good work of "improving East-West relations." More grave, it has sorely complicated everyone's estimation of the factors shaping the behavior of major West European countries (and the underlying political balance within them).

In the circumstances perhaps it is not surprising that the institute specialists have by and large simply adapted the implications of the recession to their line of analysis--avoiding any significant adaptation of their line of analysis to the implications of the recession. The consequences are three-fold: *First*, they deal with the recession as a secondary aspect of other issues--e.g., relations within the Atlantic Alliance, the progress of the Common Market, and the domestic sources of Western foreign policy. That is, their allusions to the recession are commonly only in terms of the shadow it casts over other topics. Hence, they repress it as an independent problem raising a series of distinct questions. *Second*, when they assess the recession itself, they treat it symptomatically rather than essentially. That is, they concentrate on its dimensions, duration, and immediate effects (unemployment levels, negative growth rates, declining investment schedules, etc.) rather than on the challenges it raises to structure or system. Their interlocutors are more logically Western economists immersed in "economic indicators" than they are Soviet ideologists fascinated by the fundamental vulnerabilities of capitalist society. And, when they return to the intrinsic flaws of "state-monopoly" capitalism, it is to underline the eternal failure of Keynesian economics, not to weigh the impending upheaval of social or political institutions. *Third*, they tend to minimize the disruptive effects of the recession on East-West relations; indeed, they insist that Western Europe's economic tribulations ought to reinforce the value of détente. If ever the West needed economic cooperation with the East, it is now. And so, far from featuring the West's economic plight, they offer themselves (or their markets) as an antidote.

In essential respects Soviet policy and the inclinations of those who are its primary architects have much of the same quality. For them, too, the recession has not come as an altogether welcome development. Their stake in détente is,

after all, considerably more significant than that of the specialists. They are the ones who made it the principal mode of policy. (To suggest that the specialists are anything other than an echo of that policy and, marginally, its theorists would be nonsense.) Thus, to the extent that the recession has hampered "the normalization" of East-West relations, either by sidetracking Western leaderships, by accentuating Western insecurity, or (as the Soviet press stresses) by strengthening the hand of détente's opponents, people like Brezhnev and Gromyko presumably regret it.

If avoiding a subject is any sign, their public utterances over the last two years show a conspicuous reluctance to embrace the West's economic failures as a new policy front. One can comb the speeches of Soviet leaders (with the partial exception of Suslov and Ponomaryov) and find scarcely a mention of the problem. Here and there a stock reference to capitalism's inferiority appears (Gromyko in his speech on the occasion of the Twentieth Anniversary of the Warsaw Pact, May 1975, allowed as that "there is no doctor to be found who can cure capitalism of its ills"). And now and then there will be an allusion to soaring unemployment in Western societies but only in order to prove the superiority of socialism. Never during this entire period in any speech by Brezhnev, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Pelshe, or Kosygin has there been the slightest hint that the current economic crisis creates the opportunity to pursue objectives in addition (let alone, as an alternative) to those of the past. Invariably their discussion of contemporary international affairs focuses on the changes that have taken place in Soviet relations with the Federal Republic and the United States, the tasks still facing "peace-loving forces," the essence of the problem in cases like the Middle East, Cyprus, or Angola, and the disruptive activities of the Chinese. Brezhnev once did say, "Mankind is presently going through a stormy period in its history. The public forces, classes and parties

fighting for social progress, against the power of big capital and against the forces of reaction are acting ever more resolutely and purposefully."³³ But that was all. It had no connection with his appraisal of the international context and it was not repeated in subsequent speeches.

One wants to be careful. The impression can easily be left that the West's economic crisis is no more than an awkward distraction for most of the foreign policy establishment. Those Soviets who treat it otherwise--who pretend to see in it great portent--are then made to seem either exceptional or disingenuous.

Such is not the case. A moment ago it was argued that the Soviet "mind" on the economic crisis is subtle and involved, composed of a range of preoccupations, and not belittled by a crude or simple contest of views. Those, therefore, who from the start have been absorbed by this development are probably not an alien, much less a disaffected, element within the leadership. More likely, they are the extreme expression of concerns and hopes that animate all of their colleagues. Only it is conceivable that many colleagues do not care to invest so much in these concerns and hopes or perhaps they are more occupied by other matters. Their self-restraint, however, does not alter the fact that they have an interest in the creative power of the West's crises and that this interest is left to coexist with their stake in the pursuit of détente.

I have written "crises" because this is the key to understanding the point of view of those who focus on the question of fundamental change in Western Europe. The economic deterioration of the last two years constitutes only a part of what excites them. If it were only a question of a new recessionary cycle--even one deeper than any since the 1930s--they would have reason to gloat but not to give the period revolutionary significance. It, however, is more than that. It is the convergence of a whole series of "crises:" A recession on the heels of an acute monetary and financial crisis; in turn, a critical stage in the rapid

collapse of the "old structure of the world capitalist economic structure;" combined with the "sharpening of ecological, food, and population problems;" and coming at a time when capitalist society is experiencing an urban crisis and a general increase in social tensions. It is this "interweaving" of crises that makes the 1970s seminal, says one of the more noteworthy participants in the discussion.³⁴ "In other words, the deepening general crisis of capitalism is truly comprehensive and has become even more all-pervading." Nonetheless, the outsider might be forgiven for wondering how seriously Soviet connaisseurs would take these interlocking crises were it not for the prospect that the West's current economic difficulties are only a prelude to a much lengthier period of low-growth, unemployment, and inflation. Since this is a prospect, however, the claim that the "general crisis of capitalism" has entered a "qualitatively" new phase has more than the empty ring of ideological incantation.

In these circumstances, certain of the Soviet elite, including leaders like Boris Ponomarev, have apparently convinced themselves that Western societies, in particular, several in Western Europe, and, in particular, several with powerful Communist parties, are vulnerable to rather far-reaching fundamental structural change. The image that emerges is of (1) an assault on the "commanding heights of the economy," the nationalization of major industry, and the extension of planning, (2) a reallocation of resources, accenting social welfare and income redistribution and deemphasizing defense spending, (3) a devolution of authority to working-class organizations, at least, at the enterprise level, and (3) an internationalization of the struggle against the multi-national corporation within the Common Market.

The role of Ponomarev and like-minded people has been to argue that change on this scale is compatible with détente. Not merely compatible, they remind colleagues who worry about the economic crisis' other side, but a suitable

objective of détente. The specifics are obscure but the exhortation, unmistakeable. Détente has, by constraining the hand of aggressive imperialist circles, created a safer context for the "democratic and revolutionary struggle" in capitalist countries; it has undermined the "social basis" of the "war parties" and the military-industrial complexes;" and it has "stimulated changes within the social democratic parties," leading the most advanced among them toward "united action with the Communists."³⁵ These achievements, Ponomaryov seems to be saying, should not be a mere excuse for détente or an *ex post facto* justification but a reason to join the pursuit of détente to a vision of substantial, tangible, near-term structural change in major West European countries. "In origin, substance and results," he writes, "détente is not only a political, but also a *social* factor representing a new and important stage in the worldwide anti-imperialist struggle." (My emphasis.)

The ideological struggle is, thus, turned to the offensive. A rallying cry that had been essentially defensive when détente carried the threat of contaminating socialist society with bourgeois ideas and travelers took on a far more aggressive quality when détente paralleled a growing convulsion of the Western setting. Predictably the same political figures who had been the most sensitive to the dangers of détente in the earlier phase were now in the van of those celebrating its link to the transformation of capitalist society. In one burst of enthusiasm, Ponomaryov exclaimed,

The sharpness of class contradictions in the capitalist system as a whole, the instability of the situation and mass discontent in many capitalist countries have reached a point where at any moment in one or another link of that system the way be opened for radical revolutionary changes.³⁶

Though bolder than other Soviet leaders were prepared to tolerate--Ponomaryov was given the chance to tone his language down in a series of major speeches over the next twelve months--he represented a side to Soviet emotions that is

doubtless present throughout the political elite.

Perhaps his expectations are cruder and more immoderate than those of sophisticated observers like Nikolai Inozemtsev, the Director of IMEIMO and the most prominent of the academic foreign policy specialists. But Inozemtsev has produced his own semi-apocalyptic version of capitalism's "aggravated contradictions."³⁷ True, the analysis is considerably more refined, displaying a complete command of conceptual inventions borrowed from the West, including the theories of transnationalism, interdependence, and post-industrialism. And one suspects that he is not particularly at ease with Ponomaryov's notion of a "mighty shift" in "class battles" leading to "a direct confrontation with the state-monopoly system."³⁸ Still, he, too, responds to the prospect that capitalism has entered a period of rapid change, change which he maintains is likely to be qualitative as well as quantitative--that is, which promises systemic change not merely as interruption of the social peace. More to the point, his analysis is evidently satisfactory to the likes of Ponomaryov and Mikhail Suslov. In May, 1975, François Mitterrand made his long-delayed pilgrimage to Moscow to exchange views with the Soviet leadership. When it came time to explain the CPSU's views on "the world crisis of capitalism," Suslov and Ponomaryov turned the floor over to Inozemtsev.³⁹

Portugal

Between Mitterrand's being in Moscow and Moscow's perception of fundamental change in Western Europe, there is a crucial intervening influence. From April 25, 1974 to November 25, 1975, the Soviet perspective on détente, the Left, and "the deepening general crisis of capitalism" was significantly affected by the evolution of events in Portugal. The impact unfolded almost imperceptibly for the outside observer--in part, because it was a major Soviet objective to keep the

remainder of policy insulated from developments there. The effort failed, but the full degree of the failure may elude us if we do not stand back from the immediate story of Portugal and consider its dramatic effects on other dimensions of Soviet policy in Western Europe.

To do this, I have divided the period into the revolutionary phases through which the Soviet attitude has passed. The choice is simplified by the tendency of the tumult to race toward moments of crisis, each stimulating an escalation in Soviet expectations, until the end came late in 1975. The first stage is from the overthrow of the old regime in April 1974 until the March 11 counter-revolutionary putsch. It has, in turn, two phases: One, from the April revolution to Spínola's ouster at the end of September, a period of tentative Soviet enthusiasm and considerable reserve, over which the fate of the Chilean revolution still cast a heavy shadow; the other from the end of September to March 11, a period of mounting confidence. The second stage is from March 11 to Gonçalves's defeat at the end of August, again, divided into a least two phases. One, from March 11 to the "July Days," the period of the Communist Left's ascendancy and the emergence of a revolutionary vision; the other, from the triumphs of July to the turning of the tide at the end of August, the period of "permanent revolution." A third stage, a kind of post-revolutionary coda, emerges between the repudiation of the Communist Left in late August and the ultimate disaster of November.

April 25, 1974-March 11, 1975

The Portuguese Revolution came as a benevolent diversion from the bitter turn of events in Chile the previous October. Brezhnev took consolation in June in the confidence that it was "not events in Chile but the events in Portugal that lie in the general direction of social development." It, however, came at

at a particularly hectic time: At a moment when the Soviet leaders were struggling to sort out the lessons of Chile (as were the leaders of West European Communist parties, generally with quite different results) and when simultaneously most of Western Europe and, indeed, the industrialized capitalist world was spinning into economic chaos (amidst which the French Communist party would miss by a whisker election to power). Because, however, the Soviet leaders evidently regarded the Portuguese revolution as still too rudimentary to apply the emerging lessons of Chile, it served during the early months primarily as the proof offered by Ponomaryov and his fellow optimists of the quickening momentum of the "battle for social progress" or, as one of them put it, of the "continents' shift to the Left."⁴⁰ Along with Peru and before very long Greece, Portugal instantly became the standard illustration of basic trends within the West.

This did not mean, however, that the Soviet leaders, including the Ponomaryovs among them, yet dared believe that Portugal's revolution was secure or profound enough to raise the issue of Chile. There was too much reserve, too little psychological investment, during the first five months of the new regime to think that this elemental discussion applied. Chile's importance did not begin to matter until a revolution's orientation was sufficiently evident--and the revolutionaries' power sufficiently great--to justify preemptive violence against counterrevolution, smashing the state bureaucracy, coopting the army, throttling the Maoists, and upending society. Not that the Chilean experience did not recommend measures to be taken fairly early in the process (the importance of maintaining economic equilibrium, of carrying the middle strata and peasantry with you, of removing the "fascists" from authority, and of infiltrating the military, unions, and other strategic institutions). But in these first months the essential lesson of Chile--"to master and flexibly employ all forms of revolutionary struggle"--was still somewhat beside the point. The revolutionary

forces must know when to shift forms of struggle--when to pass from peaceful to "non-peaceful," from "legal to illegal," from parliamentary to insurrectionary forms of struggle. The peaceful path to socialism does not mean that "the working class and its party" should be wedded to any one particular form of struggle; that they should put "blind faith in legality" when the bourgeoisie is ever ready to violate that legality in order to crush the democratic movement. They must master "the complex interaction and alternation" of a whole range of strategies and recourses.⁴¹

The lesson was beside the point because no degree of mastery could compensate if the revolutionary forces were not in a position to apply it. And the distinctly subdued analysis of the situation throughout the spring and summer suggested that Soviet commentators sensed that Portugal's revolutionary forces were not. The implications of far-reaching change in Portugal were unmistakably impressive and the hope that the Armed Forces Movement could, with the counsel of the Portuguese Communist party, carry it off, unmistakably aroused. But Soviet commentators were not sure that the Armed Forces Movement was fully in command. The other players of consequence--from the center-right, center, and Socialist political parties to the senior military outside the original "Captains Movement," including Spínola and Gomes--were still numerous. Not even when Adelino Carlos da Palma's lost gamble in July brought Vasco Gonçalves to power and COPCON to life did Soviet analysis abandon its reserve. Everywhere "we were asked what Soviet people thought about the Portuguese Revolution," recounted the first head of a Soviet delegation to visit Lisbon. "We replied, of course, that the people in the Soviet Union welcomed the April events and were sincerely happy to see the Portuguese people launch out on a new life free of fascist dictatorship."⁴²

It can be argued, of course, that this temperance had nothing to do with

the Soviet leadership's real feelings; that it was a calculated discretion designed to contain the anxieties of the Soviet Union's Western partners in détente. No doubt the Soviet leaders would have wanted to protect détente from the ill effects of Portuguese developments had they believed there to be any. Or, more essentially, had they believed them to be at all serious. In fact, however, this was the period in which a significant part of the political elite was arguing that a certain degree of structural change in Western societies was not only compatible with détente but a logical product of it. As long as events in Portugal seemed unlikely to rush to a radical dénouement and as long as the Soviet Union kept hands off, the Soviet leaders had no automatic reason to fear a disruptive link between this pleasing development and détente.

Even after the Armed Forces Movement and what was by now a frantically active PCP capitalized on Spínola's effort to organize a conservative groundswell against the leftward drift to drive him from power, Soviet analysts preserved a noticeable detachment. In October, an extremely well-connected Soviet journalist and former functionary of the Central Committee apparatus, Alexander Bovin, turned his attention to summing up the results of the Revolution's first six months.⁴³ His judgment was rendered in three areas: Progress toward the termination of the colonial war; toward the "remolding of the political structures;" and toward the "modernization of the economic system." In the first area, the new order had "passed [the] test with flying colors." At a pace "surprising to many," it had granted independence to Guinea-Bissau, tackled the problem of the Cape Verde Islands, and arranged a specific timetable for transferring sovereignty to Mozambique. Only Angola remained an unsettled question and that, Bovin sympathized, for good and complicated reasons.

In the second case, the elimination of "fascist political structures and

institutions," a "great deal" had also been accomplished--but far from all. The principal state and political institutions on which the "dictatorship rested" had been abolished. "Yesterday's butchers" were in prison. The National Assembly, the corporate unions, the fascist party, and the fascist youth organization had been disbanded. Basic democratic freedoms had been proclaimed and political prisoners released. But, Bovin pointed out, it was one thing to liquidate institutions, another "to cleanse" the "state apparatus" of those who are "unwilling or unable to implement the new policies." An effort was underway, "but it has not yet been completed, especially in the provinces." Moreover, the reorganization of the police and national guard promised the MFA's program had "yet to be carried out."

In the third sphere--resolving the economic problems facing the new regime--Bovin stated flatly, "the rate of progress has so far been minimal." The political and economic processes, he said, "are developing, as it were, on different planes." Progressive changes in the political sphere "are taking place against the background of a relatively unchanged situation in the economy, where the big monopoly groups continue to hold sway in alliance with foreign capital." Inflation and unemployment were growing; production, in some cases, declining. "More likely than not, the economic situation will continue to deteriorate." And the new leadership was not, in his estimation, well-placed to deal with the problem. "Conflicting approaches" and "lack of experience" hinder the "elaboration of a clearcut economic policy by the ruling coalition."

Hence his warning: "If the carnations" are not to be crushed, if "the revolution which began as a festival" is not to end in tragedy, "a great deal has yet to be done." Revolution is, "above all, a perpetual battle against counterrevolution." It is, he said, a "day-to-day political struggle" that demands "resolution" and "caution," "firmness" and "flexibility."

The lesson of Chile. For all their misgivings, the Soviets were now sufficiently impressed to put the problem in terms of Chile. How convenient, therefore, that the MFA (according to one of its bulletins) realized that the "final victory" was far from won; that the struggle must continue "'to prevent the enemy from recovering and reorganizing his forces;" and, as if taken from Soviet writings, that "'it is necessary constantly to analyse the balance of forces, never hesitating to change, if need be, the entire conception of our maneuver and the order of operations against the enemy.'" Bovin comes right out and says it: "The revolutionary forces have taken to heart the experience of Chile. They know that "a defender of the revolution who puts his gun aside too early can be the undoing of the revolution." (And they know that there is such a thing as too much freedom, which the "pseudo-Left" exploits to "provoke clashes and conflicts in an attempt to generate political tension.")

When Portuguese events entered this category, however, an important threshold was being crossed. The advance that inspired the Soviet Union to apply the lesson(s) of Chile also brought complications to the two larger dimensions of Soviet policy in Western Europe: Portugal could no longer be kept separate from the growing controversy between the Soviet Union and West European Communist parties; nor from détente.

In the first case, by the turn of the year, Portugal had transformed a semi-abstract debate over the implications of Allende's failure into an extremely tangible source of discord. Since the moment of the Chilean revolution's collapse, the Soviet and East European leaderships had gone in one direction and the West European Communists, with the Italians and Spanish at their head, (further) in another. Chile stirred in the Soviets their lingering Leninism--their instinctive willingness to force events, their preoccupation with power under seige, and their readiness to deal with the obstacles to a political

revolution--to borrow a phrase whose use they would disapprove of in this context--"administratively." In the Italians, on the other hand, it stimulated an even stronger conviction that revolution is not to be made from above; that a good deal of the revolution has to be achieved *before* the communists ever seek a share of power; and that they must not put themselves in the position of accepting power with no more than a 51 percent electoral base. Thus, even without Portugal, these two camps within European communism would have sped down their divergent paths. But with Portugal their fundamental disagreement acquired a special and, I think, historically important intensity. Portugal has been a watershed in the evolution of the Soviet Union's relationship with West European communism. While that climax does not occur until the summer of 1975, it begins to build in the fall--when the Soviets accept the prospect of a far-reaching revolution in Portugal and, therefore, triumph the lessons they chose to learn from Chile, lessons that the Italians, Spanish, and others consider wrong for Portugal and destructive to their own revolutions.

Portugal's advance now also begins to burden the Soviet pursuit of détente with a new task. The acceleration of events bolstering Soviet hopes served at the same time to accentuate Western apprehensions and, as the Soviets were being informed by American newspapers, the American Secretary of State's morbid pessimism over the inevitable surge of communism in this country. If the Soviet leaders had had any illusions about Portugal not spilling over into East-West relations these were fast fading by late fall 1974. The West Europeans, led by the Germans, were beginning to treat the transformation underway in Portugal as a grave alteration of the West European setting. And, if the implications of that were not clear enough, Kissinger in Moscow in October reportedly warned the Soviet leadership that the West would not tolerate change modifying the postwar balance of power in Europe.

Therefore, policy is taxed to calm these concerns, to dissuade the West from defining the problem of Portugal in these terms, in short, to insulate détente and Portugal from one another. To do this, the Soviet Union adopted a low-profile, low-risk approach, consisting of two or conceivably three elements. The first and most obvious was the avoidance of a direct involvement in Portuguese affairs. "Our hands are clean," clearly this was the image that the Soviet leaders wanted to sink in. They refrained from any rush toward contact with the new regime: Great numbers of Soviet delegations did not travel to Lisbon to negotiate trade, aid, and cultural exchange agreements; no Soviet leader arrived to praise the revolution, let alone to proclaim fraternal solidarity with the Portuguese people. The Soviet press made no celebration of Portuguese events--and, while this can be partially explained by Soviet reserve over the prospects of the revolution, it becomes more conspicuous in view of the satisfaction that the Soviet leaders had a right to feel over what had already been accomplished. In fact, Soviet diplomats in Lisbon were likely telling their American and West European counterparts that the Soviet Union did not have the slightest intention of "subverting" Portugal. By the spring it is reported that the Soviet ambassador, Arnold Kalinin, was regularly repeating this to the American ambassador, Frank Carlucci.⁴⁴ If they were at first tempted to take advantage of the change to seek access to Portuguese naval facilities, they quickly backed away when the sensation that this would create within the West became apparent. Even the financial support given the PCP, a long-standing practice in Soviet relations with several West European parties, was kept at a circumspect level.

Second, Soviet commentary tried to make developments in Portugal appear as unthreatening as possible. Anytime Alvaro Cunhal, the PCP's General Secretary, or leader of the MFA would deliver reassurances to the Portuguese middle classes.

Soviet writers would give it a prominent place in their reports. Bovin, for example, noting how "very moderate" the platform of the "Popular Unity type government" was, quoted Cunhal: "It is confirmed every day that capitalists in Portugal have no reason to be afraid. What is needed is that they accept the new circumstances." Bovin adds, the regime's "aim of a more equitable distribution of the national wealth does not affect the role of private capital in developing the economy." More to the point, Bovin and his colleagues went out of their way to dispel concern that Portugal would now bolt the Western camp. The country's membership in NATO is not being questioned, they continually pointed out.

Finally, it is possible that the Soviets also began to caution their friends in the Portuguese Communist party against proceeding too recklessly or with too little regard for the consequences outside Portugal. Tad Szulc's contacts told him that the Polish leader, Edward Gierek, on a stopover in Lisbon on his way back from Cuba in January 1975, had appealed to Carvalho, Gonçalves, and Cunhal "to look at the global picture, not just at their domestic situation."⁴⁵ Poland, he allegedly commented, would "deplore a situation in which Portugal could become so polarized as to bring tensions between Moscow and Washington that would damage détente." One does not know, however, whether Gierek was speaking for more than himself. Not that he would have given the Portuguese advice displeasing to the Soviet leadership, but the perspective reflected in the report of this encounter is completely consistent with the Poles' own stake in Soviet-American détente. Rumors have it that the Soviets in Lisbon later came to the Portuguese with much the same concern. But this supposedly occurred in the spring of 1975 and, by then, the Soviet reaction to trends within Portugal was changing rapidly enough to raise some doubt about how vigorously Soviet representatives were urging restraint. We turn to this second crucial stage now.

March 11-September 1975

What might have prompted Spínola, or whoever was behind it, to attempt the ludicrous putsch of March 11 remains a mystery. Its consequences, however, do not. The steady ascent of the Left within the MFA and of the MFA over Portugal's political life now gathered real momentum. The old General Assembly of the MFA was replaced by one more carefully composed. Over it stood a new Supreme Council of the Revolution, a seemingly militant and all-powerful agency, in effect, the country's supreme political authority. The Government's coalition cabinet was subordinated to it, for only President Gomes and Premier Gonçalves were made members. The Council then immediately set about nationalizing the banks and insurance companies. More important, it made plain the MFA's intention to direct Portugal's revolution for the indefinite future. Political parties were forced to sign a "pact" recognizing the MFA's near complete power for the next three to five years, a circumstance that the upcoming elections to the constituent assembly were precluded from affecting.

To Soviet observers perhaps General Spínola was beginning to look more and more like the Russian General Kornilov, whose equally dismal attempt to stem the tide of events in July 1917 discredited the Right and opened the way for the increasing radicalization of Russian politics. When, a month later, Gonçalves and his military colleagues declared themselves ready to disregard the results of the election for the Constituent Assembly, maybe to some of these same observers the memory of another constituent assembly in January 1918 also came back. Finding comfortable analogies for the Portuguese revolution, however, was not the essential aspect of the Soviet reaction at this point. Nor, for that matter, was guiding the strategy and tactics of Portugal's revolutionary forces.

Its striking feature was the increasing tendency to follow the lead of

the most ambitious among these revolutionary forces. Increasingly the Soviet leadership appeared ready to give itself over to the judgments of its Portuguese allies. Not necessarily those of the PCP alone--the Soviets had realized from the start that the revolutionary vehicle would have to be the MFA. They put their confidence in an alliance between the PCP and the officers sympathetic to the Party, Gonçalves in the forefront. (In tying their star to the MFA--as the PCP tied its--the Soviet leaders were banking on the ascendance of the right kind of Leftist within the military, a plausible but ultimately disastrous gamble.) Rather than do their own accounting of the situation in Portugal, they trusted these forces to know what the traffic would bear. Their contribution would be the continued struggle to insulate these events from those elsewhere. Thus, the faster things moved in Portugal--and the deeper the stirrings of their revolutionary hopes--the harder they worked to protect détente from Portugal and vice-versa. Everywhere their people were assuring listeners--the American ambassador in Lisbon, American journalists in Washington, American academics in Moscow--that the Soviet Union had nothing to do with the course of Portuguese events, that it had no intention of exploiting Portugal's revolution to damage the Western Alliance, and that it did not seek a bridgehead on NATO's southern Atlantic flank. Throughout this period, that is, from March 11 to the turning point in July, the Soviet press confined itself to reporting on developments in Portugal, with marginal editorializing on the behavior of the Portuguese socialists. Still, the pleasure they derived from these developments was barely concealed. For all their circumspection, the Soviets were allowing themselves to be carried along by the accelerating adventure of their Portuguese sympathizers. The impending drama of Portugal's effect gathered in the fact that Western communist parties were not.

The Climax: "Permanent Revolution"

In July, Portugal arrived at what the Soviet Union took to be the moment of truth. The confrontation building between the militant Left and the moderates since the seizure of the Socialist party's *Republica* in May (in truth since the April elections) erupted into a direct trial of strength on July 10 when Mário Soares and his fellow Socialist minister, Francisco Salgado Zenha, quit the coalition government. For Cunhal and his Soviet benefactors it was February 1948: The Socialist party was walking out of the Czechoslovak coalition government, counting on its exit to force the hand of Edward Beneš against the communists. Instead the communists would seize on this act to isolate the non-communist parties and consolidate their own hold on power. Gonçalves announced that the MFA now planned to dispense with political parties and speed the revolution, unhindered by their petty ambitions and infighting. General Saraiva de Carvalho (playing Trotsky to Gonçalves' Stalin, but ultimately with considerably more success) arrived back from Cuba declaring the need to strike down counterrevolutionaries. By then the Popular Democrats had joined the Socialists in their boycott of the government, leaving only communists and their MPD allies in civilian governmental posts, and then, alone entirely, when Melo Antunes, the last of the MFA moderates, was dismissed as Foreign Minister. Cunhal, meanwhile, was laboring feverishly to mobilize the support in the armed forces, the labor unions, the workers' committees, the territorial commissions, and the media that would be necessary for the imminent final assault on power.

It was at this point that the Soviets, drawn on by the implacable logic of their faith in Portugal's Marxist-Leninists, took the last step and accepted the sweep toward "permanent revolution." They not only accepted it; they sounded the charge. At least Konstantin Zarodov did in his now famous article in

Pravda, August 6, 1974.⁴⁶ His was one of the more perfect renditions of the concept since Lenin applied it with historic effect in November 1917. The Portuguese revolution now had its climactic theoretical framework.

Zarodov's exhortation (or rationalization) centered in two related propositions: First, that the revolution must be made by a determined leadership capable of moving boldly, seizing the moment, and leading the masses "from above." Second, that the revolution must not get bogged down in phasing but must intertwine the "democratic" and the "socialist" stages. By the first, Zarodov justified the apparent readiness of the Gonçalves-Cunhal axis to liberate itself from the slow nurturing of social revolution, done within the rules of the existing system, and following the dictates of a reasonably open, semi-pluralistic process. Seemingly Cunhal and his powerful allies within the MFA wanted to dispense with the "parliamentary path" to socialism and seemingly Zarodov was all for it. The time had come to "debunk the still fashionable opportunist conceptions" pretending that "possession of the levers of power should be merely a final act . . . the result of some kind of nationwide referendum which is allegedly the only thing which can express the will of the majority." Leninists understand that revolution must be based on a popular majority, but who said that such a majority should be "an arithmetical concept?" It is a political one. "It is a question of a revolutionary majority which evolves not only as the result of the creation of representatives, elected organs of power but also in the course of direct revolutionary actions."

But if the vanguard is to take charge of history then it must press forward as rapidly as possible. Hence, his second enjoinder: Leninists conclude "that there is no 'wall' between the democratic and socialist stages of revolution . . . no pause in time," It is not good enough to struggle only for the development of democracy. This whole effort must be infused with and subordinated

to a striving for socialism. The working class and its party "must be constantly guided by an aspiration to go," as Lenin tells us, "'further than the furthest point of a democratic revolution.'" Zarodov adds, "the victory of antimonopoly democracy can be secured only if the struggle for this end is clearly oriented in the final analysis toward socialism."

Although for most people the Zarodov article came from out of the blue, the argument in it, in fact, has an interesting history. This history helps one to understand the place that his intervention occupied in the evolution of Soviet attitude toward the Portuguese revolution.

The *Pravda* article in August was not Zarodov's first call to "permanent revolution." The previous April in his own journal, he presented an analysis anticipating much of what he was to argue five months later. But at the time it was joined to another highly revealing argument.⁴⁷ Marxist-Leninists, he said, have always been occupied with the question of "where and when the next breach of the capitalist system will take place." Will it be in one country ("as was the case, for instance, in Russia in 1917, and in Cuba in the late 1950s")? Or will "a whole group of countries more or less simultaneously take the socialist path (as was the case immediately after World War II)?"⁴⁸ Then a curious digression on the role that the slogan, a "united states of Europe," had played in the period after 1914: Lenin had accepted this notion because "it proved so attractive to progressive and anti-war elements" and because it helped in the struggle against monarchical regimes. But it eventually gave rise to the "misconception that every national revolution must of needs fully depend on revolution in other countries."

Moreover, a "democraticized European 'United States'" would obviously have had a capitalist basis and that basis guaranteed--"whatever the achievements in political democracy--that the USE would have become a bulwark of reaction."

The European capitalists would have used it to "suppress socialism in Europe." Second, Lenin warned, the idea "could 'be wrongly interpreted to mean that the victory of socialism in a single country is impossible.'"

What did any of this have to do with Portugal? Why dredge up an old and obscure idea that had never figured seriously in Lenin's strategy? (The menace of the Common Market was clearly not Zarodov's subject.) Why evoke the Soviet Union's experience with "socialism in one country," even if it was a considerably more important notion than a United States of Europe? And what was the connection between the two?

I think that Zarodov was challenging the Soviet Union's prevailing priorities. He was, I think, rejecting the tendency to let Soviet hopes ride on the gathering strength of the PCI, the *Union de la gauche*, and other electoral partnerships on the Left. If these arrangements did not end by swamping communism with an ever more diverting set of compromises, their likely payoff seemed to him distinctly inferior to the rewards from "the victory of socialism in a single country"--Portugal. He wanted to, as he put it, "unleash revolutionary energy and initiative," to free them "from the fetter of a one-sided, undialectical and consequently false understanding of internationalism."⁴⁹

He, like Lenin, understood the importance of "concentrating all efforts on developing the revolutionary movement within Russia" (Portugal). Despite a general "worldwide revolutionary upsurge," there was no "really powerful and mass revolution in Germany or in any of the other imperialist powers that could divert all the forces of the bourgeoisie," presumably a disparagement of Italy and France's potential. The revolutionary front was in Russia. But the timid in the Party's Central Committee--"the strike-breakers of the revolution"--dared not move. Hiding behind their "opportunist pseudo-internationalism," they argued, "If we are crushed, 'we will be more likely to damage the cause of a

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
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socialist revolution in the West.'" Lenin had showed, and presumably Zarodov thought someone needed reminding, "that the tactic of waiting interminably has nothing to do with proletarian internationalism."

This was not the kind of approach that was likely to have much appeal to most of the Soviet leadership in April 1975. In the first place they were not so wrapped up in the fortunes of the Italian and French Left that it made sense to pose the problem in terms of fundamental policy choices. They were not about to commit everything to either the election of Left governments in France and Italy or to the making of permanent revolution in Portugal. They wished the Portuguese well and they had begun to think seriously about just how well the Portuguese might do, but, in April when Zarodov published his article, they were a long way from urging their own revolutionary experience on them.

"Socialism (or Revolution) in One Country," however, was an idea possessing a certain crude inexorability. Once the momentum of events in Portugal began to gather speed, the Soviet leaders were carried along by their eagerness to believe in the judgment of revolutionary (Marxist-Leninist) forces. A forward strategy that they refused to embrace in order to bring things to a head suddenly appeared in a different light when things began to come to a head anyway. Events seemed to be shaping permanent revolution--a seductive proposition where permanent revolution forcing events was not. Faced with the cataclysm of July, the Soviet leaders, it turned out, were opposed to permanent revolution on occasion not in principle. (It is the counterpart of the earlier argument that the Soviet Union's current reluctance to see the PCI or PCF in power depends on context rather than principle.)

This brings us to the ultimate formulation of the problem of fundamental change and détente. I have been arguing all along that there is a side to Soviet emotions that wants to believe in the compatibility of the two. Thus, when

Ponomaryov insists on the link between détente and a far-reaching structural transformation of West European society, I do not think that he is making Brezhnev a foe. Brezhnev may not be willing to sacrifice other important objectives of the *Westpolitik* to the link but he is not its opponent. Nor do I think that, when Zarodov insists on the feasibility of permanent revolution in Portugal in August, he is making Brezhnev a foe. Brezhnev may not have been ready to impose permanent revolution in the spring but that does not mean that he was opposed to inheriting it now. Thus, I interpret Brezhnev's ostentatious endorsement of Zarodov on September 16, 1975, to be what it seemed: A statement of agreement. I do not think that it was a political maneuver destined to protect his rear against militant elements within the leadership. He had no rear to protect. There was no fundamental disagreement between him and people like Ponomaryov. Neither was willing to subordinate change to détente; both were capable of being transported by the prospect of dramatic transformations when *conditions thrust them forward*. Both, in short, believed that détente could and would withstand the shocks of change in the West (provided the Soviet Union did not make a profession of instigating them).

That was the crucial implication of Portugal. Its crucial effect, however, was on the Soviet Union's relations with West European communism. And this, in the long run, is likely to be more important. For, Portugal extinguished the last of the Soviet Union's illusions about the chasm separating it from Western parties like the Italian--which was increasingly all of them, save for the Portuguese. No doubt the leaders of the PCI, PCE, and even the PCF--despite their public defense of the Portuguese--found the Soviet Union's unreconstructed Leninism distressing proof how out of touch it was with the realities of Western Europe, an insensitivity that had grim implications for the degree of understanding that they could expect for their own plans.

But, on the Soviet side, the disabusing was far ruder. Portugal proved to the Soviet leaders that the *compromesso storico* was not merely a dubious strategy but a fundamental repudiation of the experience of Eastern Europe. Portugal drove home the realization that, when the PCI's leaders rejected "people's democracy" as a way to and a way of revolution, they meant it. The Soviet leaders had to stop pretending that their differences with the Italians were over strategy and tactics; stop pretending that once the road to power had been traveled that the Italians would gradually become more orthodox; stop pretending that ultimately the Italians wanted the same thing for socialist Italy as they. The firmness and totality with which the Italians and the Spanish rejected the "Portuguese way"--even in Portugal's circumstances--made it impossible to take refuge in the hope that as the revolution worked its effect in Italy (or Spain) these two parties would be readier to abandon their compromises, to end the chaos of pluralism, and to seek the leading role of the Party.

In large part, I think, this complete awakening accounts for Zorodov's incensed attack on "opportunism" in the course of his appeal for permanent revolution. These "Mensheviks," these opportunists, he fumed: They would undermine the essence of revolution; they would destroy the revolutionary instrument. "They would like to dissolve it in an ideologically amorphous organization or any alliance set up according to the formula 'unity for unity's sake.'"⁵⁰ In what appeared to be a direct reference to the *compromesso storico*, he said:

Their logic is the same as that of Mensheviks. According to them, the very nature of the pan-democratic movement wittingly does not permit the party of the working class to go beyond the bounds of the demands which suit all its participants, including even wavering and inconsistent ones. Hence those same calls for communists to be 'moderate,' that is--translated into clear political language--to trail along at the back of the movement and not be at its head.

That the dream of permanent revolution exploded in early September does not resolve the issue. The defeat of the Gonçaves-Cunhal axis and their revol-

utionary strategy could not reverse or remove the effect of the previous months. Perhaps it made the Soviets more conciliatory in the struggle to organize the pan-European conference of communist parties; they came to the October 9-10 meeting of the 27 delegations with a fundamentally more moderate draft of the basic document. But it could not erase the effect of Portugal. It could not because the Soviets refused to see the defeat of Gonçalves and Cunhal as invalidating their conception of how change was to come to Western Europe. In November, when Cunhal took his defeated (permanent) revolution out on to the streets, the Soviets went with him. (And when the organizers of the pan-European conference assembled to put the finishing touches on its basic document the Soviets were back to their old hard-line position.)

With the crushing of Cunhal's last gasp gamble, they will doubtless apply themselves to evaluating the errors of the Portuguese experience. Until, however, they are able to confess to themselves that the errors of the experience are not what matter, but the error of experience itself, the gap will grow between what is turning into two European communist camps. And the Soviets will continue to underestimate the divisive effect of their conception of fundamental change in East-West communism--struggling instead to reconcile it with the progress of East-West détente.

FOOTNOTES

1. See the *Journal Officiel des Communautés Européennes*, December 27, 1973, No. C 114/8.

2. The suspicion was not entirely fanciful. At the time, EEC representatives were implying that perhaps COMECON did not really have the authority to negotiate on behalf of member states. The question owed at least as much to their reluctance to give this organization legitimacy as it did to the concern that it was an inappropriate interlocutor.

3. *Pravda*, March 21, 1972, p. 2.

4. "We think that it is also time to put on the agenda the elaboration of a European program of economic and cultural cooperation. In this connection, a question arises: Is it possible to find a basis for some forms of business relations between the intergovernmental trade and economic organization now existing in Europe--between the C.M.E.A. and the Common Market? The answer is probably yes, if the states that are members of the Common Market refrain from all attempts at discrimination against the other side and if they promote the development of natural bilateral ties and all-European cooperation." *Pravda*, December 22, 1972, p. 4.

5. N.N. Inozemtsev's report to the 1972 Varna Conference of European Institutes, published as "Les relations internationales en Europe dans les années 1970," in *Europe 1980* (Geneva: A.W. Sijthoff, 1972), pp. 121-36.

6. Yuri Shishkov, "The Malaise of the Common Market," *New Times*, no. 44 (November 1974), p. 20.

7. The "sad-to-say" point of view has some interesting qualifications. To judge from Ponomaryev's primitive attack on British membership in the Common Market, for the benefit of François Mitterrand during his visit to Moscow in

May 1975, some Soviet leaders were reacting according to simple instinct. In fact, to a greater or lesser degree, virtually all Soviet leaders appeared to react instinctively on this issue. On the other hand, several of the institute specialists with whom I spoke this past spring appeared far less single-minded. One or two were even wondering whether it was not desirable for the British to stay in, though they never explained themselves in much detail. If they had a more involved calculus in this instance, however, there is reason to suppose that they bring a more intricate set of criteria to other Common Market-related issues. By the same token, of course, I then have less right to treat the views of people in the institutes as those of the leadership--as I did a moment ago. Here was testimony to Soviet confidence in the power of the Common Market--power that produced and then prospered from British adhesion.

8. Y. Shishkov, "The 'Common Market' at the Crossroads," *International Affairs*, no. 7 (July 1975), p. 94.

9. Academics within the two principal international affairs institutes made the most elaborate case. See, for example, A.I. Yutkin, *Tsentry sopermichestva* (Moscow: Izdatelstvo "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya," 1973), and D.E. Melnikov, ed., *Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya v Zapadnoi Evrope* (Moscow: Izdatelstvo "Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya," 1974).

10. See, for example, Y. Davydov, "USA-Western Europe," *International Affairs* (January 1974), p. 40.

11. Figures like Boris Ponomarev, the conservative apparatchik responsible for foreign policy, who tend to seize on any sign of "revolutionary change" in the outside world, have little in common with the sophisticated experts at Inozemtsev's and Arbatov's institutes. While the "sectarians"--to borrow Joan Urban's term for the more traditional, ideologically-oriented types--were also focusing on the vulnerability of the capitalist societies, nothing suggests that

they gave greater resonance to any particular academic appraisal of Atlantic relations than other Soviet leaders.

12. Vladlen Kuznetsov, "Common Market's Common Troubles, *New Times*, no. 51 (December 1974), pp. 10-11. See also Vladimir Lavrenov, "Common Market: New Year, Old Problems," *New Times*, no. 3 (January 1975), pp. 18-20.

13. Vladlen Kuznetsov, "Détente and Atlanticism," *New Times*, no. 23 (June 1975), p. 5.

14. Vladimir Lavrenov, "Dangerous Course for Little Europe, *New Times*, no. 52 (December 1975), p. 21.

15. V. Kuznetsov, "'European Defense' Again?" *New Times*, no. 49 (December 1973), p. 11.

16. The French President's extraordinary comment was made in a press luncheon May 21, 1975; see *le Monde*, May 23, 1975, p. 3.

17. The assumption Soviet diplomats in France reported to me during interviews in May 1975.

18. See, for example, V. Matveyev, "NATO at the Time of Changes," *International Affairs* (August 1975), p. 88; M. Ponomaryov, "The Capitalist World: Military Expenditures and Arms Build-Up," *International Affairs* (September 1975), pp. 128-130; and Lev Bezymensky, "And the Wind Returneth," *New Times*, no. 42 (October 1975), p. 23.

19. This is not the place to explore it, but I am convinced that the Soviet conception of the European balance as "global" and comprehensive is genuine and not a negotiating ploy. Nor can I imagine the Soviet military or political leaders actually plotting the use of conventional military forces from any narrower perspective. NATO's tendency to judge the balance in fragmented or disaggregated terms--featuring only the aspects unfavorable to it in one region, admittedly the critical region--may not be the way things are judged in Moscow.

20. Last spring after speaking with Soviet academics in Moscow and various of the delegates to the Vienna talks, I had assumed that Soviet leaders would be making this kind of choice by late 1975. That is, after waiting for six months following the CSCE to see what pressures the NATO powers would be under to soften their positions in Vienna, they would then decide whether to begin an earnest search for compromise or settle for a symbolic accord. And I was wagering on the latter course. Not only has détente continued to lose momentum since July, however, but the upcoming leadership uncertainties in the USSR, the United States, and the Federal Republic make it increasingly difficult to sort out the issues of détente, to focus on its problems, and to make a commitment to attack these problems. So long as this situation persists, the Soviet Union's basic choices in MBFR are likely to be postponed.

21. M. Dobrosielski, "Peaceful Coexistence and European Security," *International Affairs* (June 1972), p. 35.

22. See Harry W. Schaefer, *Comecon and the Politics of Integration* (New York: Praeger, 1972), p. 172 and Phillip J. Bryson and Erich Klinkmuller, "Eastern European Integration: Constraints and Prospects," *Survey* (Winter 1973), pp. 101-02.

23. This quotation is from *Pravda*, July 30, 1971, but the same point has been made many times in many different places.

24. COMECON may not be the only relevant illustration. Conceivably the reforms introduced into the Warsaw Pact since 1969, while not primarily motivated by the imperatives of détente, were nonetheless valued in part as an additional source of cohesion in an era of détente. For a discussion of these reforms giving the Pact greater organizational content and upgrading consultation, see Lawrence T. Caldwell, "The Warsaw Pact: Directions of Change," *Problems of Communism* (September-October 1975), especially pp. 2-10.

25. Valentin Yaroslavstev, "Commitments Binding on All," *New Times*, no. 45 (November 1975), pp. 18-19.

26. The Final Act reads, ". . . this cooperation should take place in full respect for the principles guiding relations among participating States as set forth in the relevant documents." Nowhere are the terms of the first principle (on "sovereign equality, respect for the rights inherent in sovereignty") explicitly noted in this section. If the general reference to principles affords them the protection of the first principle then it also reaffirms their obligations under the seventh principle (on "respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the freedom of thought, conscience, religion or belief").

27. See Georgi A. Arbatov, "Reciprocity after Helsinki," *The New York Times*, October 8, 1975, p. 37.

28. This particular analysis was provided by a senior official of the Quai d'Orsay but variations on the same themes have been repeated to me by a wide range of observers.

29. He was, for example, the figure who provided the first prognosis for the bilateral relationship after the May elections, to the further annoyance of the PCP. See *le Monde*, June 8, 1974, p. 6 and, for the PCP rejoinder, *L'Humanité*, June 9, 1974, p. 3.

30. E. Silin, "Alignment of Forces in the Capitalist Countries," *International Affairs* (March 1975), p. 83.

31. Lev Bezymensky, "Whose Hour in Western Europe?" *New Times*, no. 37 (September 1974), p. 8.

32. For an energetic and intelligent but ultimately unconvincing attempt to do so, see Joan Barth Urban, "Contemporary Soviet Perspectives on Revolution in the West," *Orbis* (Winter 1975).

33. His pre-election speech in June 1974. See *Pravda*, June 15, 1974, p. 3.

34. The comment is from T.T. Timofeyev, the Director of the Institute of the International Workers Movement, the organization most responsible for analysing the role of the Left in Western societies. See his article, "The Great Struggle for Peace and Progress," *International Affairs* (August 1975), p. 7.

35. Boris Ponomaryov, "The World Situation and the Revolutionary Process," *World Marxist Review* (June 1974), pp. 5-6.

36. The occasion was the fiftieth anniversary of Lenin's death in January 1974. *Pravda* did not print this excerpt from his speech but other writers picked it up. See Vladlen Kuznetsov, "Battle for Oil," *New Times*, no. 4 (January 1974), p. 14.

37. *Pravda*, August 20, 1974, p. 4.

38. This is from his second "Lenin" speech, this time on the occasion of the 104th anniversary of his birth. See *Pravda*, April 23, 1974, p. 2.

39. For an account of these meetings, see Claude Estier, "La rencontre de Moscou: 9 heures d'entretien," *l'Unité* (May 2-8, 1975), pp. 3-7.

40. Ernst Genri, *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, November 6, 1974, p. 14.

41. Joan Urban in "Contemporary Soviet Perspectives on Revolution in the West," finds a certain diversity in Soviet commentary on Chile. I, however, see virtually no deviation from the general view just summarized and, this is, in my estimation, the heart of the issue for them. For a sample from a range of sources, see, in addition to Ponomaryov, "The World Situation and the Revolutionary Process;" O. Yuriev, "The Paths of the Socialist Revolution," *New Times*, no. 23 (June 1974), pp. 18-20; M.O. Karamanov, "Opyt Chili i revolyutsionnyi protsess," *Rabochii klass i sovremennyi mir* (November-December 1974), pp. 131-41; and V. Tkachenko, "The Chilean Lesson," *International Affairs* (November 1974), pp. 133-36.

42. Interview with Yevgeny Pitovranov, First Vice-President of the U.S.S.R. Chamber of Commerce and Industry, in *New Times*, no. 28 (July 1974), p. 14.

43. See his important article, "Six Months of the Portuguese Revolution," *New Times*, no. 43 (October 1974), pp. 20-23. Bovin ordinarily writes for *Izvestiya*.

44. Tad Szulc, "Behind Portugal's Revolution," *Foreign Policy* (Winter 1975-76), p. 44.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 33.

46. Zarodov is the editor of *Problemy mira i sotsializma*, the chief organ of the international communist movement. His article stirred widespread commentary in the Western communist and non-communist press.

47. Konstantin Zarodov, "Leninism on Consolidating the Victory of the Revolution," *World Marxist Review* (April 1975), pp. 65-77.

48. *Ibid.*, p. 69.

49. *Ibid.*, p. 70.

50. *Pravda*, August 6, 1975, p. 3.